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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of legal commentators have argued against
restraints on the alienation of legal claims.1 A regime without such
restraints would permit plaintiffs to sell their claims to third parties,
effectively allowing the transfer of litigation risk from plaintiffs to others.2
Courts increasingly have tolerated claim sales and have begun to view
restraints on alienation skeptically.3 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, for example, concluded in 1997 that it would no longer recognize the
common law doctrines of barratry, maintenance, and champerty,4 which
prohibit a stranger to a controversy from, respectively, inciting litigation,
assisting in prosecuting litigation, and agreeing to take over litigation.5
These doctrines collectively form one of two legal obstacles to the
development of legal claims markets. 6 The second obstacle is a refusal by
1. See, e.g., Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12
YALE J. ON REG. 435 (1995) (describing how permitting a market in tort claims could achieve
some of the goals of tort reform movements); Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal
Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485 (1992) (arguing for permitting
claim sales except in certain circumstances, such as where they might lead to harassment of a
defendant); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329
(1987) (arguing that plaintiffs should be allowed to sell personal injury claims); Paul Bond,
Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297
(2002) (urging the legalization of champerty, subject to regulatory oversight and to certain
exceptions); Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1996) (offering
economic and fairness arguments in support of claim sales); Teal E. Luthy, Comment, Assigning
Common Law Claims for Fraud, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001 (1998) (arguing that fraud claims
should be alienable).
2. The most radical of these proposals would allow plaintiffs to sell unmatured tort claims for
wrongs that have not yet occurred. See Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort
Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383 (1989). Cooter's insight is that markets for unmatured tort claims
could produce, in effect, no-fault insurance. The sale of rights to unmatured claims could
constitute at least partial consideration for the purchase of insurance, and in the event such a claim
matured, the insurer could waive the right to the claim in exchange for payment from the potential
defendant. See, e.g., id. at 385 ("[S]uppose that drivers sell some of their rights to recover for
tortious automobile accidents to their own insurance company,... [which] waives these rights in
exchange for payment from the insurance companies of other drivers. This series of private
agreements would create a regime of no-fault auto insurance."). For criticisms of Cooter's
proposal, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-
and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1810 (1995); Charles J. Goetz,
Commentary on "'Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims ": Collateral Implications, 75 VA.
L. REV. 413 (1989); and Alan Schwartz, Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort
Claims ": A Long Way Yet To Go, 75 VA. L. REV. 423 (1989).
3. For a review of litigation trends, see Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits:
An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57 (1999-2000).
4. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997).
5. The classic article discussing these doctrines is Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24
CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935).
6. Although champerty may be enforced criminally, some courts have allowed defendants to
raise the defense that a claim was champertously assigned, in effect using champerty doctrine to
void assignments. See generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Assertion of Defense of Champerty in
Action by Champertous Assignee, 22 A.L.R.2D 1000 (1952 & Supp. 2000) (discussing such cases).
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some courts to enforce contracts purporting to sell choses in action,7
especially for those that, if not assigned, would not survive the death of
their original owners. 8 Courts have generally shown more willingness to
allow assigmnent of contract claims than of tort claims9 and, within the
latter category, more willingness to allow assignment of property damage
claims than of claims for personal injury.'0
Businesses devoted to purchasing and prosecuting claims remain
legally problematic at best." Even in the Massachusetts case abolishing the
common law prohibitions, the court noted mysteriously in dicta that its
decision would not legalize "the syndication of lawsuits."' 2 New Jersey is
another state that has no bar on champerty,1 3 but there, tort claims are not
assignable 14 In Texas, the state that has perhaps gone furthest to allow
claim sales, legal claims are generally assignable, 5 and the bar on
champerty has been lifted, 16 but barratry remains a criminal offense, 17 and
7. See, e.g., Tiernan v. Jackson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 580, 597 (1831) ("The general principle of
law is, that choses in action are not at law assignable."). The common law prohibited assignment
of any legal claim, but equity traditionally allowed assignment of contractual claims. See, e.g.,
Kan. Midland Ry. Co. v. Brehm, 39 P. 690, 691 (Kan. 1895). The rules in many jurisdictions have
loosened considerably, especially in contract cases. See, e.g., Bouchard v. People's Bank, 594
A.2d I (Conn. 1991) (allowing assignment of a chose in action).
8. See generally R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Assignability of Claim for Personal Injury or
Death, 40 A.L.R.2D 500 (1955 & Supp. 2000) (summarizing the rule and citing cases). For an
example of a survival statute, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (1994) (providing that all civil
actions, "except actions for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff," shall survive the
plaintiff's death).
9. See W.W. Allen, Annotation, Validity of Anti-Assignment Clause in Contract, 37 A.L.R.2D
1251 (1954 & Supp. 2000).
10. See W.W. Allen, Annotation, Assignability of Claim in Tort for Damage to Personal
Property, 57 A.L.R.2D 603, § 4 (1958 & Supp. 2000).
11. For a survey of the current status of champerty law in all of the states, see Bond, supra
note 1, at 1333-41.
12. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 n.7 (Mass. 1997). Susan Martin suggests
that this dicta may mean that "it is permissible for one person, like Saladini, or one business entity
to support someone else's lawsuit, but it may not be permissible for a group, i.e., a syndicate, to
do the same thing." Martin, supra note 3, at 61. A slightly different interpretation would be that
the court reserved the right to prevent the operation of a business devoted to purchasing legal
claims, in contrast to a situation in which a particular business buys a single claim.
13. See Bouvier v. Balt. & N.Y. Ry. Co., 51 A. 781, 785 (N.J. 1902). For more recent
sources, see Dobner, supra note 1, at 1549 n.93.
14. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:25-1 (West 2000) (making only contractual choses in action
assignable).
15. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.014(a) (Vernon 2004) ("(A]n interest in a cause of
action on which suit has been filed may be sold, regardless of whether the judgment or cause of
action is assignable in law or equity, if the transfer is in writing."); Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1987).
16. See, e.g., Perry v. Smith, 231 S.W. 340, 342 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921).
17. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(a)(1) (Vernon 2003) (making it an offense to
"knowingly institute[] a suit or claim that the person has not been authorized to pursue"); see also
Medlock v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 24 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App. 2000) (upholding
discipline against an attorney accused of barratry). Medlock involved a lawyer who solicited
business from a recent accident victim. It is not clear whether the Texas courts would uphold a
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the courts have found that certain classes of cases, such as malpractice,
1 8
are not assignable. With no apparent political lobby agitating for increasing
alienation of claims, the future of alienability is uncertain.
This Article's purpose is not to predict whether alienation will become
more commonplace but rather to consider the normative question of
whether legal claims generally should be alienable. Many of the arguments,
however, turn out to depend in part on such a prediction. If alienation of
claims is relatively rare in a particular jurisdiction, moral and other
noneconomic considerations should not pose barriers to sales of claims, but
economic considerations might. If, by contrast, alienation were widespread,
claim sales would pose little economic danger, but noneconomic objections
might become more serious.
The existing literature on sales of claims relies primarily on economics,
yet it might intuitively seem that, while allowing claim sales would promote
efficiency, it would be problematic on philosophical or other noneconomic
grounds. Many people at least have this intuition about other surprising
proposals for market ordering: Deregulating the adoption market might
improve the ability of prospective adoptive parents and birth mothers to
arrange transactions that are both mutually beneficial and likely to improve
babies' welfare, 19 but such sales might commodify parent-child bonds. 20 I
will argue, however, that this intuition is backward when applied to the
occasional sale of legal claims.
As long as claim sales are voluntary, they should not further
commodify the legal system, even if we accept the standard account of
commodification theory. A principal concern of commodification theory is
that commodification by some will, in effect, produce commodification
among all-with a single baby sale, for example, diminishing the value of
all parental relationships. Because legal claims, unlike babies, are generally
already seen as largely financially motivated, permitting claim sales would
barratry finding against a lawyer who engaged in similar conduct but offered to purchase a claim
instead of to serve as a lawyer.
18. See Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 393-94 (Tex. App. 1997) (emphasizing
"the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship, and the confidentiality of that relationship"
in explaining the public policy grounds for the exception). Some courts in other states have placed
limits on the assignment of malpractice claims to parties who were adversaries in the underlying
litigation. See, e.g., Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. 1991). Texas has a related bar,
preventing an alleged tortfeasor from accepting assignment of a plaintiffs claim against a joint
tortfeasor as part of a settlement with the plaintiff. See Int'l Proteins Corp. v. Ralston-Purina Co.,
744 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1988).
19. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). Landes and Posner are cautious about the implications of
their analysis, suggesting only "the possibility of taking some tentative and reversible steps
toward a free baby market." Id. at 347. The article has often incorrectly been identified as
advocating a "free market" in babies.
20. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 657, 685-86
(1995).
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likely have the opposite effect, if any at all, by making claims not sold seem
less motivated by financial concerns. Similarly, the voluntariness of claim
sales helps to insulate them against other noneconomic attacks. Corrective
justice, for example, is not offended by alienation, either by plaintiffs of
their entitlements or by defendants of their obligations, because the means
by which tortfeasors rectify the wrongful losses they impose is not
important. If a plaintiff chooses to have a loss rectified in the market or a
defendant pays another to take on a future liability, corrective justice is
satisfied. Similarly, voluntary sales of claims do not violate either the rules
or principles of legal ethics, at least in the absence of a conflict of interest.
Nor are voluntary sales of claims psychologically problematic. While
theories of procedural justice emphasize the importance of control and
participation in litigation, a voluntary decision to alienate a claim is no
more worrisome than a voluntary decision to settle one.
The economic balance, however, is more equivocal. The economic
theory of alienability does not disfavor permitting claim sales, and prior
commentators have noted several benefits. Most notably, claim sales can
allow plaintiffs to obtain judgments more quickly, and such sales can allow
those who are most capable of handling the risks and challenges of
litigation to do so. Claim sales, however, might well be rare because
litigants' information about their own cases is likely to cause an adverse
selection problem. Indeed, the rarity of retroactive liability insurance for
defendants suggests that, were claim sales permitted, only a few might
occur. That the market would not be robust might seem only to discount the
potential economic benefits of claim sales, but a market in which only a few
claims are sold may be problematic. Claims sold are not likely to be a
random sample of all claims and may be among the most likely to present
problems that will offset any efficiency benefits they provide. In particular,
these claims may have disproportionately negative effects on the legal
process, the development of precedent, and settlement.
The primary ambition of this Article is thus to flip the intuition that
alienation of legal claims is problematic philosophically but not
economically. It considers philosophical and other noneconomic arguments
related to claim sales in Part I and the economic considerations related to
such sales in Part II. Part III presents a helpful thought experiment by
considering an extreme: a legal world with a mandatory-alienation regime.
In this world, the intuition flips back. With everyone selling claims, the
adverse selection problem would disappear, because asymmetric
information would not cause the market to unravel. Noneconomic
considerations, however, would reemerge, because claim sales would no
longer be voluntary. The question then becomes whether a market with
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pervasive, but not mandatory, claim sales would sufficiently coerce litigants
to alienate claims so as to present the same difficulties.
I. NONECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
This Part considers four possible noneconomic justifications for
opposing claim sales-commodification theory, corrective justice, legal
ethics, and procedural justice-and rejects each in turn. A desire for brevity
prevents full treatment of all the disputes concerning the proper conception
of each of these areas. My methodology is thus to focus on the leading
accounts of the relevant areas, with consideration of implications of variant
approaches restricted primarily to the footnotes. In applying the standard
academic account of these views, I do not intend to endorse these accounts
or even to enter the debate about whether these approaches are normatively
superior to welfare economics.
The ultimate goal is simply to show that, as traditionally formulated,
the apparently most formidable objections to claim sales are not powerful.
This analysis, of course, leaves open the possibility that there is some other
noneconomic consideration that renders alienation problematic. Many of us,
after all, seem to share an intuition that there is some moral problem with
claim alienation, and intuitions often find theoretical support upon deeper
reflection. I cannot pretend to have canvassed all of moral theory in search
of support for this intuition, and it is possible that some moral or other
theory besides those that I explore here, whether currently existing or as yet
undeveloped, might condemn claim alienation. But the modes of analysis
that I consider are not straw men either. Concerns about commodification,
corrective justice, legal ethics, and procedural justice largely explain the
intuition against claim alienation, and yet these concerns do not condemn
the practice.
A. Commodification
It is both surprising and revealing that no commentator appears to have
considered whether bars on transfer of legal claims cohere with other
restraints on alienability, such as rules preventing the sale of organs,
children, and sexual services. 21 The small literature urging the sale of legal
21. Two commentators come close. First, Marc Shukaitis considers briefly whether "there is
something distasteful about buying or selling personal injury tort claims," Shukaitis, supra note 1,
at 345, and cites two works about alienation, id. at 345 n.74. The concern that sale may be
distasteful is an important one, and Shukaitis's observation in response to the concern, that "[a]
market in tort claims may seem unnatural to many people simply because a market does not exist
now," id. at 346, may be on the mark. Shukaitis, however, does not confront any other individual
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claims conceives itself as connected to discussions of either tort reform or
more narrow problems in particular areas of law.22 Meanwhile, the
philosophical literature on inalienability and commodification does not
explicitly discuss sales of legal claims. Yet it is hard to imagine an
inalienability rule of more immediate relevance for the legal system than
the bar on selling most legal claims.23 The logical work to consider first in
evaluating alienability is that of Margaret Jane Radin, the most forceful
proponent of inalienability for certain forms of property.24 Although Radin
nowhere considers the alienability of legal claims, a brief review of her
analysis will allow for development of the strongest possible argument
against alienation and then a refutation of that argument.
Radin argues that commodification may at times be problematic. She
critiques, for example, economists who "conceive[] of rape in terms of a
marriage and sex market," because "market rhetoric conceives of bodily
integrity as a fungible object. 25 The problem with rape is not just that it
constitutes a theft of services,26 but that it effectively changes the nature of
a person, for "[b]odily integrity is an attribute and not an object.,
27
Someone who is raped has not simply lost something compensable in
dollars but has effectively become a different person. Market rhetoric
"transforms our world of concrete persons ... into a world of disembodied,
fungible, attribute-less entities possessing a wealth of alienable, severable
'objects"' and thus "reduces the conception of a person to an abstract,
fungible unit with no individuating characteristics. '28 Radin worries that if
the world is not now the noncommodified ideal, then acquiescence to
evolutionary decommodification may reinforce the legitimacy of
comnodification more generally,29 while an attempt at revolutionary
arguments in favor of inalienability. Second, Adam Scales notes that Margaret Radin's concerns
about commodification might be relevant to assessing the practice of settlement factoring, which
is a form of claim alienation designed for tax purposes. See Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement
Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 859, 952-53, 957. Scales
does not, however, analyze whether Radin's analysis condemns settlement factoring or claim sales
more broadly.
22. See, e.g., Choharis, supra note 1, at 491-500 (suggesting that claim sales can serve an
aggregation function and thus serve as an alternative to class actions).
23. The conceptualization of lawsuits as a form of property is not new. See, e.g., Carol
Necole Brown, Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival of
Takings Claims After Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REv. 7 (2003) (arguing that potential
takings suits against the government are a form of property that should pass with the underlying
property).
24. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987).
25. Id. at 1879-80.
26. For a summary of the economic approach to rape, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 238 (5th ed. 1998).
27. Radin, supra note 24, at 1880-8 1.
28. Id. at 1885. Thus, Radin concludes, "universal market rhetoric does violence to our
conception of human flourishing." Id.
29. Radin explains,
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decommodification, i.e., the position that any decommodification that is
possible should be attempted, "may wreak injustice.' 3 °
Thus, although in an ideal world "market-inalienability would protect
all things important to personhood," in our nonideal world "it may
sometimes be better to commodify incompletely than not to commodify at
all., 31 The public policy inquiry depends first on an assessment of whether
or not something should be conceived of as important to personhood and, if
so, on an assessment of whether there are reasons to allow alienability
nonetheless. Radin concedes that "[t]here is no algorithm or abstract
formula to tell us which items are (justifiably) personal. 3 2 The answer
depends in part on whether "someone may subjectively identify herself'
with an item,33 but a "moral judgment is required in each case. 34 This
judgment depends on the item having "an appropriate connection to our
conception of human flourishing" and on the relationship with the item
forming "part of an appropriate understanding of freedom, identity, and
contextuality. '35 The relationship between people and their homes, for
example, is justifiably personal because it "permits self-constitution within
a stable environment.,
36
With respect to whether to allow alienation of items that are justifiably
personal, Radin asks rhetorically, "If some people wish to sell something
that is identifiably personal, why not let them?" 37 Then, she offers three
justifications for inalienability: "a prophylactic argument, assimilation to
prohibition, and a domino theory. 38 The prophylactic argument is that the
sale of an item of property integral to personhood might create a
The evolutionary approach harbors a transition problem because it does not address
how we can progress toward noncommodification using existing social structures and
conceptual schemes that are thought to be artifacts of commodification. Partial
decommodification in the context of a continuing implicit commitment to a dominant
market order may mean that any deviations from the market order will only reinforce
commodification, by being seen merely as exceptions that prove the market rule.
Id. at 1875-76. Radin does not explain just how partial decommodification would be seen as
"exceptions that prove the market rule," and the assertion that decommodifying a particular form
of property could in effect increase commodification seems strange. Perhaps her worry is again
rhetorical, that those who seek partial decommodification are necessarily conceding the
legitimacy of other commodifications. Yet, if proponents of partial decommodification
emphasized that they hoped to advance decommodification further, it is hard to see how a victory
could be a defeat.
30. Id. at 1876 (explaining, for example, that attempting to decommodify the tort system
without providing an alternative means of redressing the injuries of tort victims would be unjust).
31. Id. at 1903.





37. Id. at 1909.
38. Id.
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presumption that the sale is coerced, even if an uncoerced sale is
theoretically possible.39 For example, "selling oneself into slavery .... [is]
so destructive of personhood that we would readily presume all instances of
it to be coerced. 'AO The prohibition argument is simply that there might be a
"moral requirement" that a good not exist in a commodified form, for
example, because the commodification "creates and fosters an inferior
conception of human flourishing."'4 For Radin, "love, friendship, and
sexuality" are possible examples of goods that morally should not be
commodified. 2 Finally, the domino theory is relevant where "the
commodified and noncommodified versions of some interactions cannot
coexist. 4 3 For example, if "the existence of some commodified sexual
interactions will contaminate or infiltrate everyone's sexuality so that all
sexual relationships will become commodified,"'44 then commodification
should not be allowed. The domino theory is thus the obverse of the
prohibition theory. While the prohibition theory "focuses on the importance
of excluding from social life commodified versions of certain 'goods,"' the
domino theory "focuses on the importance for social life of maintaining the
noncommodified versions. 45
Though this is but a crude summary of Radin's theory, it is sufficiently
deep to allow development, and then scrutiny, of a case for the
inalienability of legal claims. The psychological dimension of her
analysis-that someone subjectively identifies himself with an object-
seems straightforwardly satisfied. There is no shortage of tales of
individuals whose identities become bound up with a legal dispute and who
seek a favorable result in litigation not merely because of the practical
consequences but also as a form of vindication. At the least, because legal
claims connect with an individual's past acts, they seem at least as
constitutive of identity as tangible objects such as homes, which Radin
recognizes as justifiably personal. No other form of property seems likely to
have as profound a psychological effect on self-constitution as a lawsuit,
because the success of many lawsuits depends, at least in theory, on the
rightfulness or wrongfulness of the litigants' conduct. With respect to the
moral dimension, pursuit of a legal claim may be seen as advancing human
flourishing. At least in our democratic society, political identification and
participation are encouraged, and pursuit of justice through the courts may
39. Id. at 1910.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1912.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1913.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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be a means by which an individual justifiably asserts the freedom provided
to her by law.
Moreover, the theory would go, each of the three arguments in favor of
preventing the sale of property integral to personhood applies. The
prophylactic argument applies because there is a strong possibility that a
plaintiffs decision to sell a legal claim will be coerced. An initial inability
to obtain satisfactory legal representation, or immediate financial demands,
for example, may coerce a plaintiff to sell her legal claim. In addition, the
prohibition argument applies because it is morally problematic that a
plaintiff who sells a legal claim is not merely selling something that she
owns but is compromising the legal system itself. The legitimacy of the
legal system depends on legal claims not being perceived as purely
mercenary instruments. Finally, the domino theory applies because, if legal
claims are exchangeable like securities, they will be viewed in much the
same way as securities rather than as representing moral claims against
wrongdoers. Thus, the sale by one plaintiff of a legal claim may
contaminate the aspect of legal claims central to personhood for everyone
else. Sale of legal claims would inject market rhetoric into the legal system,
which would come to be seen as something little different from the
Treasury or the Social Security Administration, a governmental body
serving a fundamentally economic function. This shift in the general view
of the legal system inevitably would affect perceptions of individual claims,
making them seem of no greater moral import than lottery tickets, and in
turn those holding the claims would appear to be mere speculators or
investors rather than moral agents.
Some may already believe this argument to be made of straw, and
although I have tried to make it as sturdy as possible, I agree that it has
substantial holes. Legal claims may well be important to personhood.
Because of the moral dimension of adjudication, litigants may define
themselves as much by their lawsuits as by any other form of property, and
at least the criteria that Radin provides are vague enough to allow a
plausible argument for counting legal claims as important to personhood.
Nonetheless, a legal claim is an inherently transient form of property,
lasting only as long as the lawsuit. In this sense, Radin's observation about
houses-that they "permit[] self-constitution within a stable
environment'a6--cannot apply. No legal regime could function if lawsuits
never ended. Eventually, a legal claim must be replaced with something
else. Sometimes that will be a favorable judgment, at other times an
unfavorable one. For the relationship between a legal claim and personhood
to matter to the legal system, the judgment that replaces the legal claim
46. Id. at 1908.
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must somehow allow any self-constitution that has occurred through the
litigation process to continue.
One might argue that the means by which legal claims are resolved are
integral to personhood. The resolution of a legal claim in a court of law,
with a decision by a judge or jury, might be critical to preserving
personhood, because it is the promise of judicial or jury decisionmaking
that separates a legal claim from other contingent assets, such as stocks,
which depend on individual companies' economic performance. If the
essence of a legal claim with respect to personhood is a judicial
determination, then the conclusion of a case leaves the claim intact. This
argument, though, ignores the fact that the psychological effect of a
judgment may depend on its content. Litigation does not build identity
merely because litigants identify themselves as litigants, in the same way as
football players may come to identify themselves as football players
whether they win or lose any particular game. To the extent that litigation
affects identity, it is largely because litigants identify themselves by virtue
of the particular positions they have advanced. Because a legal system must
be able to reject litigant claims, the system always threatens the destruction
of the property that may constitute personhood. Even a winning litigant is
left with a judgment rather than a claim, and while this might have been her
preference, the legal system cannot avoid ending the relationship between
person and property.
Even if legal claims are important to personhood, the arguments that an
individual should not be allowed to trade off personhood for other goods
are weak. The prophylactic argument is weak for the same reason that
Radin concludes that laws banning prostitution are problematic :47 If
litigants are coerced into selling claims, then the nature of the coercion is
presumably economic because sales of legal claims on the basis of other
forms of coercion, such as physical coercion, would presumably be
invalidated under standard contract law principles.4 8 Radin recognizes that
the prophylactic argument in general may be deeply troubling. For example,
47. Radin calls this problem the "double bind." She argues,
Often commodification is put forward as a solution to powerlessness or
oppression, as in the suggestion that women be permitted to sell sexual and
reproductive services. But is women's personhood injured by allowing or by
disallowing commodification of sex and reproduction? The argument that
commodification empowers women is that recognition of these alienable entitlements
will enable a needy group---poor women-to improve their relatively powerless,
oppressed condition, an improvement that would be beneficial to personhood.
Id. at 1915-16 (footnote omitted). She ultimately concludes, "I think we should now decriminalize
the sale of sexual services in order to protect poor women from the degradation and danger either
of the black market or of other occupations that seem to them less desirable." Id. at 1924.
48. See infra note 270 and accompanying text (assessing the possibility that legal claim sales
might be coerced).
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it would be troubling to prevent an individual from alienating property if
that individual is being coerced by poverty and "we then do not provide the
would-be seller with the goods she needs or the money she would have
received. 49 A utopian society might afford all people enough resources that
they would never be coerced into selling a legal claim, but in the absence of
this achievement, preventing those without resources from selling claims
will not necessarily advance the cause of personhood.
To assess the prohibition argument, we must first supply an argument
that the existence of commodification in the legal realm fosters an inferior
conception of human flourishing. Perhaps the strongest such argument
along these lines is that commodification of the legal system may intrude on
its role in advancing corrective justice. Because I consider corrective justice
below, I will not confront that argument now. Even if that or some other
argument suggested that the legal realm ideally should not be commodified,
however, market rhetoric is already pervasive in the legal system. At least,
Radin would label legal markets as reflecting "incomplete
commodification," a phrase that she also applies to the realms of work and
housing.50 While she argues that regulation, such as labor law and tenant
protections, may be appropriate for incompletely commodified goods,
Radin does not deny the appropriateness of markets in such goods. If
allowed, legal claim sales could not be blamed for the conceptualization of
legal claims in financial terms, because market rhetoric already infuses the
relationship between individuals and their claims.
Finally, the domino theory-that "commodification for some means
commodification for all" 5 '-seems inapplicable in the context of legal
claims. Allowance of sales of a kind of property may have two opposing
effects. First, the mere possibility of sales may adversely affect the
personhood of even those who don't sell, but, second, it may make those
who refuse to sell seem and feel less driven by financial considerations
relative to those who do choose to sell. In a baby sales market, the first
effect would likely outweigh the second. Baby sales might make kept
babies appear more cherished relative to sold babies, but the creation of any
baby sales might make all babies seem less cherished than they would in a
world without sales. Legal claims, however, are already partially
commodified, because even if someone pursues a claim for nonfinancial
reasons, successful pursuit of a claim for money damages results in the
transfer of money. Thus, the second effect seems likely to outweigh the
49. Radin, supra note 24, at 1910. "Thus, this aspect of liberal prophylactic pluralism is
hypocritical without a large-scale redistribution of wealth and power that seems highly
improbable." Id. at 1911.
50. Id. at 1917-21.
51. Id. at 1917.
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first. Permitting sales would make litigants generally seem only slightly
more driven by money, but the plaintiffs who choose not to sell would
likely be seen as more vigorous litigants and perhaps as more committed to
52obtaining a judgment in court.
Perhaps the most serious problem with justifying bans on claim sales on
the grounds that they threaten personhood is that we already allow some
forms of claim alienation. If settlement is seen as the alienation of a
plaintiffs claim to the defendant, then alienation is a common means by
which claims are resolved. The same might be said about claim alienation
by defendants. Once society tolerates liability insurance and thus allows
defendants to agree in advance to alienate claims, it is hard to see the
problem with alienation of claims filed against the defendants. One might
defend settlement yet condemn alienation. Perhaps one might argue that it
is more damaging to personhood to allow sale of a continuing legal claim
than to allow resolution through settlement of a claim, or one might argue
that alienation in advance is acceptable because personhood cannot attach
to that which does not yet exist. But these distinctions have little
psychological or moral resonance, and affording the opposing litigant a
monopoly on claim alienation might be worse for personhood than allowing
a free market in alienation. Of course, one might condemn both settlement
and alienation. It is difficult, though, to identify sufficient differences
between the permitted and the prohibited forms of claim alienation that
would harmonize the disparate treatment. Any claim that legal procedure
generally seeks to protect personhood thus seems specious.
Even if there were an argument that the importance of legal claims to
personhood might justify bars on some forms of claim alienation, the
argument seems tenuous, even ridiculous, when applied to all types of
claims. To take an extreme, even though corporations in court on an issue
of contract law or even public law may claim to find support in significant
moral and legal principles, we all accept that, for the most part,
corporations are seeking to maximize their own welfare. The assertion that
a corporation's legal claim might be important for personhood seems
farfetched, or at best a description of the unusual case. Even when
venturing beyond corporations to lawsuits brought by or against
individuals, personhood just isn't supremely important for many cases that
are courts' bread and butter, and the recognition that courts may have
52. Of course, a decision not to sell also might be financially motivated, especially given
adverse selection. The analysis, however, does suggest a modest proposal: that plaintiffs should be
allowed to give all or part of their legal claims to charity, regardless of whether legal claim sales
are generally allowed. Even such a rule, however, might present some problems. See infra
Subsection II.C.2.b (noting that claim sales might facilitate the manipulation of the path of
precedent by ideologically motivated litigants).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005]
important symbolic roles in human affairs should not blind us to the reality
that they also serve a practical function that often is more important. Thus,
if any proposal to reform the courts is thought to endanger personhood, an
assessment should be made of the kinds of cases that the proposal would
affect. Criminal and quasi-criminal cases, for example, may be of relatively
great importance for personhood, 3 and perhaps litigants should not be
allowed to alienate claims for child support, because the understanding that
a child is being supported by a parent may be as important as the money
itself.
In sum, even accepting the philosophical argument that property may
be important to personhood and, therefore, that inalienability rules
sometimes may be justified, this argument does not apply convincingly to
legal claims. My point, of course, is not that Radin is wrong but that, even
if she is correct, application of her framework to legal claims supports
permitting alienability. Radin's own work supports the analysis. Though
Radin does not discuss legal claims directly, she does discuss Richard
Abel's proposal for a tort system that would protect personhood by not
allowing damages for pain and suffering, which commodify the "unique
experience" of individuals. 54 Radin states that "[m]any people will find the
proposal troubling and its agenda unjust. ' '55 She explains, "To deny money
damages, inadequate though they may be, seems to compound the injury to
tort victims under the present social structure, in which we have not put into
practice other measures that would take care of them in better ways or
prevent their injuries in the first place. 56 Similarly, if alienation of claims
benefits plaintiffs (or defendants) without impairing the goals of the legal
system, then seeking to protect personhood by disallowing alienability may
compound plaintiffs' injuries (or defendants' claims of injustice) in the
absence of a better system for addressing them.
53. Perhaps the intuitively least attractive form of alienation would be to allow criminal
defendants to pay others to serve their prison terms. Economists have generally found
imprisonment justified largely because of the possibility that criminal defendants will be insolvent
and thus unable to pay the optimal level of fines. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 26, at 247
(conceding, however, that imprisonment may be justified even for defendants who could pay
optimal fines because it "prevents the criminal from committing crimes (at least outside of
prison!) for as long as he is in prison"). This argument implies that, at least in the absence of
recidivism concerns, defendants should be allowed to pay others to serve their prison terms--or,
even better, given the public costs of incarceration, to pay the state an equivalent amount.
Commodification theory provides a possible answer to the economic critique of imprisonment.
The argument, however, would focus not on the personhood of the alienator but presumably on
that of the victim or the inmate.
54. Radin, supra note 24, at 1876 (citing Richard L. Abel, A Critique ofAmerican Tort Law,
8 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'y 199, 207 (1981)).
55. Id. at 1877.
56. Id.
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B. Corrective Justice
The possibility that alienation of a legal claim offends personhood does
not exhaust the range of potential philosophical concerns about alienation
of legal claims. Perhaps the most obvious objection is that alienation of
legal claims may offend corrective justice, the moral theory of tort law.
57
Though views on its content vary, corrective justice is both a descriptive
and a normative theory of tort law, challenging the economic approach that
emphasizes the minimization of all forms of accident costs. 58 Alienation of
legal claims might seem to offend corrective justice by interfering with the
relationship between plaintiffs and defendants. If a plaintiff alienates a legal
claim, the defendant may end up paying as a result of his actions, but the
money paid will not go the plaintiff. Similarly, if a defendant alienates a
legal claim, the plaintiff may end up receiving money in a judgment or
settlement, but the check will not be written on the defendant's account.
Once either party alienates a legal claim, the connection between the
plaintiff and the defendant is severed.
The question is whether this severance offends corrective justice, and
the foundation for an argument that it might emerges from the principle of
what Ernest Weinrib has called "correlativity." 59 Weinrib identifies
correlativity as one of two critical elements of his juridical conception of
corrective justice and accurately notes that it is the one element about which
scholars of corrective justice have largely come to agree. 60 "Right and duty
are correlated when the plaintiffs right is the basis of the defendant's duty
and, conversely, when the scope of the duty includes the kind of right-
infringement that the plaintiff suffered.",6 1 Construed literally, Weinrib's
57. Corrective justice theory springs from Aristotle's analysis in Book V of the Nicomachean
Ethics. For an exploration of the Aristotelian conceptions, as well as an argument that the content
of corrective justice is dependent on judicial practical wisdom, see Mark C. Modak-Truran,
Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 249 (2000).
58. The classic statement of the economic approach is GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). Calabresi, however, allows for the
possibility that justice may place requirements on the tort system apart from cost minimization.
See id. at 26 ("Apart from the requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding
accidents.").
59. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on
Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107 (2001).
60. Id. at 107 (noting that the other element is "personality, i.e., the idea of purposiveness
regardless of one's particular purposes"). Among the works that Weinrib identifies as endorsing at
least some variant of correlativity are ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE
LAW (1999); Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
427 (1992); Stephen R. Perry, Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three Conceptions
of Corrective Justice, in TORT THEORY 24 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993);
and Martin Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 235 (1996).
61. Weinrib, supra note 59, at 118.
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formulation would appear to present no bar to alienability. When a plaintiff
sells a legal claim, her right remains the basis of the defendant's duty, and
the scope of that duty depends on the infringement the plaintiff suffered,
even if the defendant's duty is not to the plaintiff. Weinrib's work itself
does not, however, provide the best source for determining whether
alienability is consistent with correlativity. Weinrib finds corrective justice
to be embodied in tort liability alone,62 rather than in both tort liability and
ordinary extralegal moral practices. He says little about the institutions that
administer tort liability, except where those institutions themselves affect
the content of tort doctrine.63
Jules Coleman's work lends itself more easily to analysis of whether
institutions offend corrective justice. Coleman derives the requirements of
corrective justice from informal moral practices, and only then assesses
whether the law is an institution that embodies corrective justice. 64 The
view that alienability need not offend corrective justice may be supported
most easily by adopting what Coleman has called the "annulment
conception of corrective justice. 65 Although Coleman himself has
66 latowithdrawn his prior endorsement of this view, at least one theorist
continues to see it as more attractive than Coleman's later approach,67 and it
serves in any event as a usefil starting point. Under the annulment view,
corrective justice "specifies grounds of recovery and liability; it does not
specify a particular mode of rectification., 68 The annulment theory,
however, "gives no one in particular any special reason for acting, for
annulling wrongful gains or losses., 69 On this view, while a victim of a
wrongful loss has a claim to repair, corrective justice does not necessarily
require that the wrongdoer who caused the loss rectify it.70 Because the
62. See, e.g., id. at 132 & n.32 (comparing Weinrib's approach to Coleman's).
63. For example, in Ernest J. Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985), Weinrib laments the intrusion of insurance principles into tort
decisions, such as those creating strict products liability as a means of creating an insurance
regime. Yet he explicitly notes that his position is not inconsistent with the replacement of tort law
with some other institution, such as no-fault insurance. Id. at 687.
64. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 478 n. 1 (1992).
65. For an articulation of this view, see Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of
Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 365 (1992).
66. See COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 306-11. This withdrawal contributed to Weinrib's
conclusion that a consensus on correlativity had emerged. See Weinrib, supra note 59, at 128-29,
132.
67. See, e.g., Matthew H. Kramer, Of Aristotle and Ice Cream Cones: Reflections on Jules
Coleman's Theory of Corrective Justice, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 279,279-80 (1996).
68. COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 306.
69. Id. at 309.
70. The problem Coleman perceived in the annulment view is that corrective justice becomes
indistinct from distributive justice. Coleman explains that
[c]orrective and distributive justice are distinct principles of justice. That just means
that typically they give individuals different kinds of reasons for acting. But if we
accept the annulment thesis, this is not how corrective and distributive justice differ.
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annulment conception does not establish any special relationship between a
wrongdoer and a victim, alienability of legal claims does not offend it.
71
Coleman currently subscribes to what he calls the "mixed conception of
corrective justice, 72 which partially integrates correlativity, or what
Coleman terms Weinrib's "relational conception of corrective justice," into
the annulment conception.73 Coleman argues that Weinrib's direct focus on
the relationship between a wrongdoer and a victim specifies "a framework
of rights and responsibilities between individuals"' 74 in order to restore
equality between them.75 According to Coleman, the relational conception
is incomplete, as "[t]he existence of a loss is not necessary to trigger claims
based on corrective justice, nor is the point or purpose of corrective justice
to annul or eliminate a loss.",76 The limitation of the relational view,
Coleman argues, "is that it cannot take us from 'repairing the wrong' to
'repairing the losses.' 77 Thus, if Steven and Michelle both drive
negligently, but only Steven's negligence causes a car crash injuring David,
the relational conception by itself does not explain why Steven, but not
Michelle, should pay damages to David.78 Though the relational account
demands repairing of the wrong, it cannot explain why the wrongdoer who
causes an injury must pay damages, rather than, for example, requiring that
both wrongdoers "make a public statement conveying the judgment that
they were wrong to treat others as means to their ends.",79 At least on
Coleman's view, then, Weinrib's approach offers no challenge to
alienability, for it does not specify how or by whom a wrong is to be
repaired.
Coleman's mixed conception, on the other hand, offers an account of
what sufficiently repairs losses. According to the mixed conception, "the
For, as I have characterized it, the annulment view appears to hold that justice requires
that a certain state of the world be brought about, not that anyone in particular has a
special reason in justice for bringing it about. And this is precisely the way we think
about distributive justice. Therefore, in terms of their reason-giving properties,
corrective justice is indistinguishable from distributive justice.
Id. at 310.
71. One step is needed to justify this conclusion. The annulment conception does require that
"[w]rongful gains and losses cannot be annulled so as to create other wrongful gains or losses."
Id. at 306. Thus, if alienation of legal claims leads to new wrongful gains or losses, then it could
offend corrective justice.
72. Id. at 318.
73. Id. at 318-24; see also Coleman, supra note 60.
74. COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 314.
75. For the most developed explanations of Weinrib's view, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation
and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407, 444-50 (1987); and Ernest J. Weinrib,
Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485, 514-26 (1989).
76. COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 314.
77. Id. at 320.
78. See id. at 320-23.
79. Id. at 321.
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duty of wrongdoers in corrective justice is to repair the wrongful losses for
which they are responsible., 80 The alienation of a legal claim might seem to
prevent the wrongdoer from repairing the loss for which she is responsible.
Instead, she will simply pay off someone who has already repaired the
plaintiffs wrongful loss, or a third party she previously paid off will repair
the plaintiff's wrongful loss, depending on whose claim is alienated. Or, if
both claims are alienated, the culmination of the process will be one third
party making a payment to another. The question is what, on the mixed
conception's account, qualifies as fulfillment of the duty to "repair." With
alienability, the wrongdoer pays and the victim receives, but the repair is
not direct.
Although Coleman does not define the word "repair," he distinguishes
the basis of a duty to repair losses from "the ...permissible ways of
implementing the duty." 8' In explaining this distinction, Coleman offers a
hypothetical in which Donald Trump "volunteers to pay all [Coleman's]
debts of repair., 82 If this occurs, "all claims against [Coleman] are
extinguished,, 83 and corrective justice is not violated. Corrective justice is
not concerned with retribution against the decisionmaker 84 but with
wrongful losses. If a third party decides to rectify a loss while absolving a
wrongdoer of responsibility, then there is no longer a loss for the
80. Id. at 324. Coleman initially starts with a broader principle, including a duty to repair the
wrong as well as a duty to repair the wrongful loss. Id. He explains that "[tihe duty to repair the
wrong follows from the relational view; the importance of wrongful losses to the demands of
corrective justice is the remnant of the annulment view: thus, the 'mixed' view." Id. Coleman,
however, then argues that the reparation of the wrong itself is the concern of retributive justice,
not corrective justice. Id. at 325. The mixed view in the final analysis is thus "mixed" not because
it sums up the duties suggested by the annulment and relational views, but because it combines the
annulment view's emphasis on wrongful losses with the relational view's emphasis on the
connection between the wrongdoer and the victim.
81. Id. at 327.
82. Id. at 389; see also id. at 327-28 ("Therefore, it does not follow from the fact that one is
required to make repair as a matter of corrective justice that any institutional arrangement (or
mode of rectification) that discharges that duty in some other way (for example, through the
general tax office) would be unjust.").
83. Id. at 389.
84. Gerald Postema explains that "[r]etributive justice concerns the wrong, the wrongdoer's
culpability, and the appropriate response of the public. Corrective justice focuses on the victim's
loss and the claim to repair for that loss; it is not concerned with punishing, blaming, or
exculpating the injurer, or with rectifying the wrong." Gerald J. Postema, Risks, Wrongs, and
Responsibility: Coleman's Liberal Theory of Commutative Justice, 103 YALE L.J. 861, 875 (1993)
(reviewing COLEMAN, supra note 64). A plausible response is that even if it makes sense to
compartmentalize retributive justice from corrective justice for analytic purposes, it is no defense
of a practice to conclude that it violates retributive justice but not corrective justice. Nonetheless,
while a fill argument is beyond my scope here, retributive justice seems much less relevant than
corrective justice to alienability, because we generally rely on criminal law, not the tort system, to
effectuate the goals of retributive justice.
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wrongdoer to rectify.s5 Similar logic explains Coleman's conclusion that a
social scheme of no-fault insurance need not violate corrective justice.86 It
would not offend the mixed conception of corrective justice for a defendant
to pay a third party to assume the responsibility for a wrongful loss
allegedly caused by the defendant. At the same time, Coleman indicates
that allowing those who have not suffered wrongful losses to recover from
defendants who have acted wrongfully is unproblematic, as when the
plaintiffs are effectively acting as private prosecutors.8 7 If it is permissible
under corrective justice to rectify a wrong before the wrong has even
occurred by hiring a third party, then purchase by a third party of a
plaintiffs matured claim is surely permissible.
Coleman's account draws a distinction between the principles of
corrective justice and its institutional realization. "Implementing corrective
justice," Coleman observes, "requires a set of substantive liability rules" as
well as "administrative rules establishing burdens of proof and evidence.,
88
Such rules "provide the best chance of practically implementing corrective
justice under less than ideal circumstances.,,8 9 Thus, Coleman does not rule
out that institutional arrangements may affect how well corrective justice is
realized, but such an assessment does not concern the scope of corrective
justice itself. Under this conception, corrective justice does not address
alienability, though it is possible that some institutional arrangements might
be better suited for implementation of corrective justice than others.
85. But see Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law,
38 UCLA L. REV. 143, 143-44 (1990) (arguing that the resources to compensate victims must
come from the wrongdoers).
86. Coleman writes,
The reason [a victim who receives no-fault compensation] has no claim in
corrective justice to repair is that there exists some other mechanism through which the
costs of accidents are to be allocated. That means that whether or not corrective justice
in fact imposes moral duties on particular individuals is conditional upon the existence
of other institutions for making good victims' claims to repair. The capacity within a
particular community of corrective justice to impose the relevant moral duties depends
on the existence of certain legal or political institutions or social practices.
COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 402; see also id. at 404 ("[A]lthough corrective justice is private
justice-justice between the parties-whether or not it imposes obligations between the parties
depends on other social, political and legal practices.").
87. Coleman hypothesizes a situation in which a manufacturer has failed to provide an
optimal warning, but the particular victim injured by the manufacturer's product never read the
warning and thus was not harmed by its imperfections. Even though the victim has no right in
corrective justice to compensation, a cause of action granting the victim compensation "provides
him with an incentive to litigate" and to "act[] as a private regulator." Id. at 387. See generally
Kathryn R. Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who Should Pay
When the Culpable Cannot?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1990).
88. COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 395.
89. Id.
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One commentator has urged that corrective justice indeed should be
concerned about the process by which torts claims are adjudicated.90 Susan
Randall notes that scholars of corrective justice "focus on the substantive
morality of tort law rules,"9' but she insists that modern tort law can be
justified "as a matter of corrective justice (if at all) because it permits
individualized assessments of responsibility through the interplay between
its generalized standards and its processes. ' '92 As with other corrective
justice scholars, Randall seeks to formulate a descriptive account of current
practice, but she also draws normative implications. In particular, she
worries that various tort reform proposals "would limit or eliminate the
litigants' ability to participate in decision-making." 93 Randall explains this
concern by citing to the psychological literature on procedural justice.94 Her
analysis thus implicitly identifies significant potential objections to claim
alienability, but I consider procedural justice below, and whether these
considerations are interior to corrective justice need not concern me.
Placing aside procedural justice concerns, the intuitions and judgments that
philosophers believe explain our tort practice generally do not seem to be
related to alienability, let alone to condemn it.
C. Legal Ethics
Another objection to alienability is that it might change the role of the
lawyer from a professional to a mere profit maximizer. The objector might
concede that there is already much in modem legal practice about which to
despair, with profit motive a central element in the organization of large
law firms and in the prosecution of civil cases.95 Allowing alienability,
however, would not just be an incremental shift toward profit
maximization. Rather, it would destroy the heart of the ethical rules by
effectively eliminating the attorney-client relationship.96 Under current
90. Susan Randall, Corrective Justice and the Torts Process, 27 IND. L. REV. 1 (1993). For a
related argument, see Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic
Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990). Wells focuses specifically on
the practice of having a jury decide tort cases as central to corrective justice. Id. at 2393-410.
91. Randall, supra note 90, at 3-4.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. at 46.
94. Id. at 36 & nn.137-40.
95. Even many who accept that profit is an important criterion in law firm decisionmaking
urge that law firms also pay attention to the value of "professionalism." See, e.g., Edward S.
Adams & Stuart Albert, Law Redesigns Law: Legal Principles as Principles of Law Firm
Organization, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133 (1999) (considering different approaches to managing
"hybrid" organizations like law firms that seek to maximize profit and also to pursue other
objectives).
96. Some commentators are concerned that other developments, in particular the increasing
provision of legal services without face-to-face contact, might erode the attorney-client
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ethical rules, the attorney is at least obligated to consult with her client
before making significant decisions, 97 and it is the agency relationship that
distinguishes attorneys from business executives who seek merely to
advance their own personal interests. Alienation of legal claims, however,
would allow attorneys to own claims, thus freeing the attorneys of the
necessity of agency. In a world in which legal claims are mere
commodities, it is hard to see how attorneys could be anything but profit
maximizers as well.
Prosecution by an attorney of a suit in his own interest, however, does
not violate ethical rules. While it may be illegal for an attorney to purchase
someone else's tort claim, a lawyer who is himself injured may bring a suit
on his own behalf, just as an attorney, or anyone else for that matter, may
choose to defend himself in a criminal case.98 Many ethical rules are
intended to ensure that an attorney act in a client's interest rather than in a
self-interested way.99 Eliminating the incentive incompatibility between a
lawyer and a client is not an evasion of such rules but a satisfaction of them.
Purchase of a claim by a lawyer forces the lawyer to internalize all the
benefits and costs of resolving it. A lawyer in such a position will not work
unnecessarily hard to increase billable hours nor work too little because he
has little stake in the outcome. Thus, if the relevant ethical rules are seen as
a mechanism for ensuring the loyalty of lawyers to their clients, 100 once the
purchase of a claim is completed, there can be little concern that the ethical
rules have been violated.
There are several potential objections to this line of reasoning. First, the
argument is predicated on the belief that lawyers who own claims will act
in their own interests. Though consistent with economic theory, this
assertion may well not be true. The old adage is that a lawyer who
represents himself has a fool for a client.'0' Being a good lawyer requires
detachment, and even someone who believes that he will benefit from
purchasing a claim and prosecuting it himself may turn out to be badly
wrong. If the adage is true, perhaps there is an argument for paternalism,
and inalienability is the paternalistic solution. The argument for
paternalism, however, seems weak, and not just because any disadvantage
from lack of perspective is balanced by the incentive alignment that claim
relationship. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The
Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147 (1999).
97. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a) (2004).
98. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
99. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (generally prohibiting conflicts of
interest with current clients).
100. Many commentators urge that ethical rules should seek to make lawyers more than mere
hired guns. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 15-29 (1994) (discussing and critiquing the lawyer-as-hired-gun model).
101. See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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purchases provide. The intuition behind the adage is likely not that self-
interest inherently clouds judgment. After all, all lawyers are presumably
self-interested, because success in one case will bring some measure of
fame and fortune, and it seems hard to believe that the best lawyers are
those who have the least at stake in prosecuting their cases. Rather, the
intuition is that a disinterested lawyer will be more attuned to the
litigation's objective and less concerned with peripheral issues such as
vindication or reputation. Peripheral issues, of course, would not affect
someone who owns a claim arising from events in which she had no stake.
Thus, a lawyer who purchases from a stranger a claim for money damages
may not be a fool to prosecute it herself.
Second, even if it is ethically acceptable for a lawyer to prosecute a
claim once she has purchased it, the purchase itself may be problematic.
This will be particularly true if a lawyer purchases a claim from his own
client, or perhaps from an unrepresented person, because the client may
infer wrongly that the lawyer is giving disinterested legal advice when in
fact she is acting in her own interests. The practice of lawyers engaging in
self-dealing could hurt the reputation of the profession. 0 2 The argument
may seem overstated, at least absent fraud-most people would recognize
the possibility that a lawyer seeking to purchase a claim, no less than
someone seeking to purchase a car, might be taking advantage of them-
but recognition would not be sufficient to prevent abuse. 10 3 Moreover, we
may care more about whether lawyers are taking advantage of clients than
about whether car buyers are taking advantage of sellers. The legal context,
though, offers a familiar (if sometimes expensive) solution: requiring
independent representation. 104 More drastically, one might prevent lawyers
from purchasing claims, or at least from purchasing claims that they plan to
prosecute or defend themselves. In such a regime, one could purchase a
claim and have one's own lawyer prosecute it, thus allowing the benefits of
moving claims to relatively risk-averse parties without necessarily
eliminating agency costs. My point is not that such a regime should be
102. It is not clear, however, that the increasingly commercial orientation of law firms is
responsible for the low reputation of the profession. One commentator has argued that decreasing
elitism and the ascent of postmodem thought are responsible. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate
Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 305,308-11 (2000).
103. One argument is that tort victims may apply a high discount rate and thus accept low
offers for claims. Teal Luthy responds to this criticism by arguing that "[ilf the victim believes the
value of his expected judgment decreases by a certain percentage for each additional day that he
has to wait for it, he should be free to act accordingly." Luthy, supra note 1, at 1015. An
additional argument is that even victims with high discount rates would want to maximize their
returns and thus would seek out the private parties willing to pay the most for claims.
104. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer entering into a
business transaction with a client to give the client "a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent legal counsel").
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adopted,'0 5 but that if concerns about shysters are sufficiently weighty,
there are potentially effective solutions.
Third, the ethical rules may be concerned not only with clients but also
with the integrity of the courts. Lawyers prosecuting their own claims might
have a greater incentive to commit a fraud upon the court, such as
fabricating evidence or, less dramatically, seeking to misrepresent it. The
ethical rules provide incentives for lawyers to act honestly, but these
incentives are balanced by opportunities for financial and reputational gain.
Increasing the amount at stake for attorneys in a given suit may well
increase their incentives to perform well, as argued above, but it may
induce them to go too far. Greater rewards could make the potential risks
less weighty in the moral decisionmaking process. 10 6 The legal system,
however, does not generally seek to remove the mere possibility that
lawyers might be tempted into unethical conduct, such as by preventing
lawyers from having any role in managing client funds and property. 107 To
the contrary, it regulates lawyer conduct and imposes severe sanctions for
violating ethical rules. There seems no justification for a prophylactic rule
barring acquisition of claims simply because such acquisition might lead to
marginal increases in the temptation to violate ethical rules.
Moreover, there is little empirical basis for the claim that lawyers'
greater personal investment in claims would result in a marked increase in
fraud. If this were so, then we would expect the legal system to respond.
Perhaps there should be rules preventing lawyers from being overly
invested in any one case, 10 8 but there are not. Moreover, perhaps we should
prevent lawyers from bringing cases on their own behalf, but we do not.
The danger of fraud seems at least as likely in a case in which a lawyer is
interested both personally and financially as in a case in which only dollars
are at issue. If legal ethics rules do not prevent self-representation in such
cases, they should not prevent it in cases that would present less risk of
fraudulent activity. One might argue that a rule prohibiting lawyers from
purchasing claims is responsive to adverse selection, that lawyers who buy
claims are disproportionately likely to be bad apples. Yet there seems little
reason that purchasers of legal claims should have worse ethics than anyone
105. Peter Choharis argues that one benefit of claims markets is that they would reduce
lawyers' market power and control. See Choharis, supra note 1, at 445; see also Luthy, supra note
1, at 1021 (discussing Choharis's argument).
106. A separate argument is that lawyers may have reduced moral scruples in a regime that
allows alienation of legal claims. It is hard to see, however, why this should be. Perhaps an
alienability regime, by commodifying legal claims, makes money seem all the more important.
107. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (allowing lawyers to participate
in safekeeping property and regulating the means by which they do so).
108. This might be difficult to do, but one way to approximate this effect would be to
encourage large law firms to make each lawyer's welfare depend on a diversified portfolio of
cases.
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else, 1°9 and if they did, alienability might make unethical lawyers easier to
identify and police.
Fourth, alienability may offend legal ethics precepts not because it will
lead to abuses but because the attorney-client relationship itself has
benefits. In The Lost Lawyer, Anthony Kronman rejects a purely
instrumental view of the attorney's role.11° The ideal lawyer is a "lawyer-
statesman,""' and such lawyers "agree that their responsibilities to a client
go beyond the preliminary clarification of his goals and include helping him
to make a deliberatively wise choice among them."'1 l2 Even accepting this
argument, however, alienability of legal claims need not be inconsistent
with it. Clients, after all, hire lawyers not just as litigators but also, more
broadly, as counselors. Clients may continue to rely on lawyers to obtain
advice, including advice about whether to sell a legal claim, and such
advice might reflect both financial and other considerations. Of course,
clients might not hire lawyers for such advice, but they also may choose, in
the present system, to hire lawyers who will not help them deliberate.'
1 13
Finally, one might contend that alienation of legal claims is
objectionable because it may reduce the time period in which clients engage
with their attorneys. But if this is a concern, then settlement should also be
discarded. The settlement of a case means that the parties will no longer
have the opportunity to seek the advice of their lawyers about it. This does
not qualify even as a sound argument against settlement, however, because
the purpose of legal ethics rules is not to mandate increased lawyer-client
109. The best argument might be that fraud is easier to accomplish when working alone than
when working with a client because of the danger that the client will have moral qualms about
misrepresentation by a lawyer. At least with respect to minor deceptions, however, this belies
human experience, there being few examples of clients turning in their lawyers, except when they
themselves have been victimized.
110. Kronman characterizes this view of an attorney's role as follows:
The narrow view insists that a lawyer is merely a specialized tool for effecting his
client's desires. It assumes that the client comes to his lawyer with a fixed objective in
mind. The lawyer then has two, and only two, responsibilities: first, to supply his client
with information concerning the legal consequences of his actions, and second, to
implement whatever decision the client makes, so long as it is lawful. The client, by
contrast, does all of the real deliberating. He decides what the goal shall be, and
whether it is worth pursuing given the legal costs his lawyer has identified.
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 123
(1993).
111. Id. at 11. Kronman adopts this phrase from Chief Justice Rehnquist. See William H.
Rehnquist, The Lawyer-Statesman in American History, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 537 (1986).
112. KRONMAN, supra note 110, at 129. Kronman adds that lawyers are useful not only in
counseling impetuous clients but also in advising clients who may not know their own goals. "In
many cases, it is only through a process of joint deliberation, in which the lawyer imaginatively
assumes his client's position and with sympathetic detachment begins to examine the alternatives
for himself, that the necessary understanding can emerge." Id. at 133.
113. While Kronman does not reject the possibility that the decline of the lawyer-statesman is
a demand-side phenomenon, he attributes the decline of the lawyer-statesman primarily to
changes in law schools, law firms, and courts. See id. at 165-352.
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contact. Even to the extent that greater lawyer-client contact would be
beneficial, the goal should be to encourage consultation before clients make
decisions, not after they make decisions that lead to litigation. Similarly,
while an inalienability rule might be seen as having the salutary effect of
increasing lawyer-client contact, there are other, more direct routes to that
goal with a greater chance of affecting primary conduct by clients.'
14
D. Procedural Justice
The previous Sections have considered normative bases for assessing
an alienability regime. Even if an alienability regime does not offend any
principle of morality or jurisprudence, however, people might find it
offensive. Psychological dissatisfaction with a regime that permits
alienability itself might provide a normative basis for prohibiting alienation.
Moreover, we have already seen that under one view, corrective justice
depends on whether litigants perceive the adjudicative system to be just,
and the implications of commodification theory" 5 and legal ethics1 16 also
may depend in part on psychological reactions. Psychological satisfaction
with an alienability regime, however, is not easily analyzed, because it is an
empirical question about a largely nonexistent practice. Different people
presumably would react to the regime differently, and it would surely lower
the esteem in which some people hold the justice system. Because the tastes
of third parties for an alienation regime are not susceptible to empirical
measurement, the best we can do is assess how litigants themselves would
likely perceive that regime. To accomplish a preliminary analysis of this
question, we can consider the literature on litigant satisfaction with the
present adjudicative system and tentatively extrapolate.
This literature recognizes that accuracy and cost may not be the only
relevant considerations in the design of a legal system. Psychologists John
Thibaut and Laurens Walker were the first to recognize the independence of
114. For example, damages might be increased when a liable defendant acted without having
first received an opinion from counsel that the defendant's actions would be acceptable. Patent
law takes this approach, though the Federal Circuit is revisiting the issue. See Knorr-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (per curiam);
Michael Abramowicz, A Unified Economic Theory of Noninfringement Opinions, 14 FED. CIR.
B.J. 241 (2004) (explaining the role of noninfringement opinions in increasing deterrence and
reducing the incidence of litigation).
115. The assessment of whether property is important to personhood appears to have a
psychological dimension. See supra text following note 45. Commodification theory is a theory
about personhood, and it thus depends on the behavioral traits of people.
116. Legal ethics is concerned with maintaining the appearance of the legitimacy of the
system ofjustice, as well as with maintaining a system ofjustice that is in fact legitimate. Cf., e.g.,
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2000) ("A judge shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities."). If alienation advanced a perception
that the legal system was illegitimate, that itself would count as a reason to ban the practice.
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what they called "procedural justice" from traditional considerations about
the adjudicative process, 17 and legal scholars like Jerry Mashaw have
argued that adjudicative systems should take into account the "dignitary"
interests of participants." 8 Though scholars have not articulated how much
of a tradeoff between dignitary values and accuracy is tolerable," 9 if
procedural justice is an important part of the balance, an alienation regime
might at first glance appear problematic. After all, an alienability regime
presumably reduces the percentage of cases that are resolved by trial-like
procedures, and if such procedures are the paradigm of what litigants view
as respecting their dignity, then sales of claims would come at the expense
of procedural justice.
The argument that alienation offends procedural justice, however,
assumes that only trial-like procedures can produce feelings of procedural
justice. The justness of the market for claims must be independently
evaluated. Many markets, after all, are seen by participants as procedurally
fair. When I buy a used car, I may be suspicious of the seller, and I may
even end up concluding that I got a bad deal, an accuracy concern, but I am
unlikely to conclude that the system was procedurally unsatisfactory. One
can imagine other systems for distributing used cars-for example, a
governmental agency that assigns used cars to the individuals whom such
cars will most benefit-yet I would conjecture that such systems would
result in participants sensing less procedural justice than they do in the
present system.
By itself, this analogy cannot be an argument that sales of legal claims
would maximize procedural justice. Perhaps markets will maximize
procedural justice for certain types of transactions, and governmental
entities, like courts, will do so for other types. There may exist a perception
that governmental resolution is appropriate for legal claims, while market
resolution is appropriate for used cars. The analogy emphasizes, however,
117. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975). A later work is E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
118. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 169-221
(1985); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.
L. REV. 885 (1981) [hereinafter Mashaw, Administrative Due Process]; Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
119. As Colin Diver notes, the dignitary values that Mashaw identifies are not "self-defining"
or "sufficiently robust to withstand attack from the encroaching welfare state without
reinforcement from some 'prudential' argument that requires courts somehow to balance a set of
fuzzily-specified secondary values." Colin S. Diver, The Wrath of Roth, 94 YALE L.J. 1529, 1534
(1985) (reviewing MASHAW, supra note 118). As Mashaw himself has noted, "To rethink
participatory process rights in terms that make them meaningful at the level of self-definition or in
terms of the desire for community may be, necessarily, to render them nonjusticiable." MASHAW,
supra note 118, at 180.
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that an alienation regime would not eliminate a process perceived as
producing procedural justice. Rather, such a regime would supplement the
present process with a new process, and the procedural justice merits of the
new process would need to be evaluated and compared with those of the
existing system. As long as litigants would retain the right not to alienate,
the existence of an alienation option would not necessarily be perceived as
illegitimate, even by those who regard traditional adjudication as a right,
particularly if the alienation regime itself is procedurally fair.
An important experimental conclusion of the procedural justice
literature is that litigants will rate favorably systems in which they are given
a fair amount of voice and control, 120 even independent of the effect of this
control on the trial outcome.'12  Procedural justice theorists distinguish
"process control," which entails the ability to voice one's story and opinion,
from "decision control," which entails some control over the result, and
some argue that fairness judgments depend as much on process control as
on decision control.12 2 A litigant who is given a chance to tell her story will
often feel better about the process than one who is not, even if the court
treats her story as irrelevant to its eventual disposition.
Alienation of a claim deprives a litigant of the chance to tell her story to
one type of decisionmaker, a judge. But alienation provides a new class of
indifferent decisionmakers, potential purchasers of legal claims. A litigant
will be able to tell her story to these decisionmakers, and they will have an
incentive, different from the judge's but no less significant, to listen. In
addition, the litigant may have some control over the process by which a
decision is made. For example, she can choose which potential purchasers
she will consider. In addition, a litigant may be able to choose the form in
which she presents information to the potential alienators. Moreover, a
120. See, e.g., Robert J. Bies & Debra L. Shapiro, Voice and Justification: Their Influence on
Procedural Fairness Judgments, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 676 (1988); Robert Folger, Distributive and
Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of "Voice" and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 108 (1977); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant
Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 370-71 (1987).
121. Some commentators have criticized these conclusions, along with other significant
conclusions of the procedural justice literature. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value ofAccuracy in
Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 391 n.253 (1994) (offering
numerous criticisms, including that participants in the relevant studies were given no meaningful
control and that other data suggests that participants prefer adjudication through the use of
advocates); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 118, at 888 n.15 (arguing that the
studies have not "isolate[ed] perceptions of process ... other than [their] potential to provide a
favorable outcome" and concluding that "their account of what is at work in a favorable or
unfavorable perception of processes seems rather muddled"). If indeed procedural justice only
concerns considerations of accuracy and cost, then there would be no procedural justice objection
to alienability. To make the case against alienability as strong as possible, I will assume that
procedural justice is indeed independent of these concerns and that litigants do value process
control.
122. See, e.g., LIND & TYLER, supra note 117, at 94-106, 186, 206-17.
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regime permitting alienability does not affect a litigant's right to take a
claim to trial, so the alienability regime only expands her choice set,
affording additional means of controlling the litigation but still allowing her
the traditional means of adjudication. From the perspective of process
control, alienation appears superior to traditional adjudication.
This analysis, however, may seem to miss the point. Perhaps what is
important is not voice and control per se, but voice and control in a certain
kind of forum. Certainly, a litigant who is interrupted and told that she may
make her statements in the hallway during a court recess will not feel as
justly treated as one who is allowed to present his story before a judge.
Perhaps the formalism and dignity of a trial are what make litigants feel that
their statements are being taken into account. Indeed, there is evidence that
litigants assign higher procedural justice ratings to trial and arbitration than
to bilateral settlement negotiations. 123 Even though litigants have ultimate
control over settlement negotiations, and even though either they or their
lawyers presumably tell their side of the story in such settlement
negotiations, even litigants who agree to settlements do not emerge feeling
particularly favorable toward the process. 124 Just as these results suggest
that decisions made in the shadow of the law may not be equal to decisions
made by courts themselves,1 25 so too, one might argue, decisions made in
123. See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 953, 965-66 (1990); see also
Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the
Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SoC'y REv. 585 (1987) (identifying dissatisfaction with settlement in
divorce cases).
124. Lind and his coauthors conclude,
Apparently, what has been overlooked in previous analyses of the likely reactions
of litigants to traditional trial procedures is the considerable importance that litigants
attach to being treated with respect and dignity. It has been widely assumed in both
policy-oriented and academic discussions of trial procedures that the formality and
ritual of trial disturb and confuse litigants. Given our findings, it seems likely that these
very features of trial enhance, rather than diminish, the apparent fairness of the
procedure.
Lind et al., supra note 123, at 981.
125. The results also may be a product of self-selection, as the population of litigants who
choose to settle may be different from the population who proceed to trial:
[A] litigant might have refused settlement and gone to arbitration, settlement
conference, or trial because he or she already regarded the third-party procedure as
fairer. Similarly, a litigant might have settled prior to a third-party procedure because
he or she viewed the third-party procedure as unfair. For a number of reasons, however,
we do not think that such "self-selection" into procedures can account for any of our
major findings. Self-selection of this sort would logically lead to favorable, but equal,
ratings of the third-party procedures and their respective settlement procedures, because
each procedure would be rated by litigants predisposed to favor that procedure.
Id. at 964-65. Parties who settle may be different from parties who go to trial for reasons other
than their ex ante perceptions of the fairness of the systems. Economic theory, after all, suggests
that settlement does not occur randomly. For example, litigants may be more inclined to settle if
they believe that their adversaries would litigate the case aggressively, imposing high litigation
costs on them. Such litigants may be relatively dissatisfied with the fairness of settlement, feeling
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the market may not be equal in quality to decisions made in the present
judicial system.
The weakness of this argument is that the choice is not between
resolution in the market and resolution in a court, at least not in a traditional
court proceeding. Because most cases settle, the typical choice is between
market resolution and settlement. There are good reasons to think that
litigants will react better to alienating claims to third parties than they
would to settlements. Third parties will have strong incentives to treat
litigants with dignity and respect. If a third party does not do so, after all,
the litigant can refuse to cooperate with that third party; this is how
consumers react to disrespect in markets for goods and services. In bilateral
settlement negotiations, by contrast, the adversary has an incentive to
challenge the litigant's account, and respectful treatment is not necessarily
rewarded. In addition, while both market and settlement negotiations would
be informal, the litigant who can listen to bids from multiple third parties
may feel more in control than one who participates in an arm's-length
negotiation.
Perhaps the settlement process can be cathartic, but the voice and
process control that it provides are less than what an alienability regime
would offer. If, for reasons such as expense, litigants will ordinarily forgo
the dignity of the courtroom, they may find more solace in negotiation with
neutral third parties than with adversaries. Of course, adoption of an
alienability regime would not prevent the litigants from achieving a
settlement before either party alienates its claim; settlement, after all, is a
form of claim alienation, with each side alienating its position to the other.
But because settlements are more common than trials, alienation would
more often substitute for settlements between the initial parties than for
trials, and the apparent superiority of alienation to settlement is thus
particularly relevant. This argument admittedly leaves open the possibility
that a world without settlement might be superior in procedural justice
terms to one that allows settlement, but once settlement exists, alienability
provides an additional option for avoiding trial, without adversely affecting
the right to trial.
that the outcome depended on bargaining power as much as on the merits. They might have been
even more dissatisfied with the outcome, however, if their cases had gone to trial. Another
selection story points in the opposite direction. Because cases tried represent those in which there
is the greatest differential in ex ante assessments by the parties, positive evaluations of trial
relative to settlement understate the procedural justice qualities of trial. These competing stories
are difficult to weigh, however, and the inferences that Lind and his coauthors draw from their
data must be even more tentative than they make them out to be.
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II. THE ECONOMICS OF CLAIM ALIENATION
A. The Economics of Inalienability
In modem economics scholarship, inalienability receives little attention
or encouragement. Economic science, after all, is grounded in the belief that
markets are ordinarily efficient as a result of the invisible hand, and even
where market failures occur, the typical response recommended by
economists is the imposition of an appropriate tax.126 Legally minded
economists have considered rules of inalienability, but even the
foundational article on the subject treats it almost as an afterthought. Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's article Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral 27  receives
considerable attention for its distinction between property rules and liability
rules, and there remains a lively scholarly literature on the choice between
these two approaches to protecting entitlements. Despite its presence in the
title, though, inalienability receives relatively little attention. 128 Moreover,
while Calabresi and Melamed state that some restrictions on alienability
may be justified as a second-best solution, their evaluation of inalienability
rules seems unenthusiastic, designed more to identify possible reasons than
to justify existing rules.
Nonetheless, the arguments that Calabresi and Melamed suggest on
behalf of inalienability are the most general and salient, and so it is worth
considering their analysis first. The most important economic basis for
inalienability they identify is externalities. One might, for example, prevent
a sale of land to a polluter on the ground that his activities would affect not
only him but the neighbors. 129 Because "freeloader and information costs"
may make it "practically impossible" for neighbors to persuade the
potential seller not to sell, 130 inalienability may be the most efficient
result.1 3 ' This argument has an obvious flaw. If there was a concern that
pollution might create externalities, why not address the pollution, either by
taxing or banning it, rather than the sale of the land to a polluter? It seems
odd, at the least, to create a rule to ban a transfer of property as a proxy for
126. Taxes to counter negative externalities are often called Pigouvian taxes, after A.C.
PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE (3d ed. 1947).
127. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
128. Calabresi and Melamned devote fewer than ten pages to the topic, see id. at 1111-15,
1123-24--not an insignificant number, but small considering that their analysis is probably the
seminal economic work on inalienability.
129. Seeid. at 111.
130. Id.
131. In the absence of such costs, the Coase Theorem would apply to a regime permitting
alienation, and it would not matter to which party the entitlement was given.
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banning the activity.1 32 Even if there were some parties who categorically
should be barred from ownership, creating a rule barring anyone from
selling or purchasing an entire class of assets, on the basis of what buyers
might do with those assets, should require strong reasons to suspect that
buyers are much more likely than the original owners to impose negative
externalities and that the government will not be able to monitor activity
adequately.
There may be externalities in lawsuits, such as costs imposed upon
third parties summoned to appear before the court or benefits to third
parties from improved deterrence. 33 There is, however, little reason to
think that barring sales of claims would reduce the negative externalities or
increase the positive externalities from legal claims. Of greater concern is
the possibility that one party would fail to internalize the costs that it
imposed on the other. Settlement negotiations are akin to a bilateral
monopoly problem or, in multiparty cases, an empty core bargaining
game. 134 A party may try to obtain leverage in such negotiations by making
unreasonable discovery demands on other parties.' 35 Or, a party may litigate
a case to the hilt, expending more money on its prosecution of the case than
the amount at stake ordinarily would demand, in order to force the other
party to do the same. This might allow a party to establish a reputation for
aggressive litigation that will help it obtain settlements in other cases.
Parties purchasing claims might be more likely to act in this way, the
argument goes, because their reputational capital will be more at stake.
132. Perhaps there might be some circumstances justifying such an approach, at least in
theory. Suppose, for example, that various properties abutted a river. Suppose further that we
know now that there is currently no pollution of the river, but if there were pollution, it would be
impossible to determine who caused it. An inalienability rule may then be the only way of
maintaining the status quo of no pollution.
133. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of
Suit and of Settlement, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 99 (1999) (discussing both types of
externalities).
134. A bargaining game has an empty core if, for any resolution of the game, there always
exists some hypothetical agreement that a majority of those bargaining could enter into that would
make them better off. For example, if a fixed sum of money is to be split among three people by
majority vote, then no outcome is stable. If A and B each agree to take half and cut out C, then C
can offer A or B a higher percentage to cut out the other. Similarly, an agreement that all would
share equally is not stable, because any two participants could then decide to cut out the third. In
practice, of course, parties are often able to reach agreements in empty core bargaining games,
often through equal apportionment, but the instability of all possible agreements can lead to
negotiation failure. For an elegant introduction to empty core bargaining games, see MAXWELL L.
STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT
DECISION MAKING 54-58 (2000).
135. A request for discovery imposes costs on an opponent that make settlement more
attractive relative to trial and thus increases the bargaining power of the requestor. See Samuel
Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 753, 768-71 (1995) (describing how asymmetric costs in the discovery process may affect
settlement).
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This story, however, has significant flaws. First, although it is plausible
that parties purchasing claims will be more frequent litigants than original
claimants, lawyers will be repeat players regardless of whether parties are,
and parties may select lawyers with reputations for aggressiveness.
36
Second, more frequent players are not necessarily unusually obstreperous.
The theoretical intuition is that a frequent litigant cannot achieve a
reputation for toughness by spending heavily in just one case, but must
maintain the strategy across a number of cases. Though a frequent
aggressive litigant will be able to threaten credibly, the same litigant will
endanger her ability to threaten credibly by bluffing, because every once in
a while a bluff will be called. For infrequent litigants, bluffing may be a
cheaper and equally effective approach, especially with risk-averse
opponents. The empirical observation is that insurance companies, the
paradigmatic example of frequent litigants, often settle claims rather than
seek a reputation for aggressiveness by fighting all claims to the end.
137
Third, litigation may be less personal when it involves third parties, and
parties concerned solely with money will be less likely to inflict gratuitous
injury on an opposing party. In sum, while we cannot eliminate the
possibility that purchasers of legal claims would be more litigious than the
original claimants, there seems little reason for this to be the case.
Even if it were true that purchasers of legal claims impose more
negative externalities or produce more expensive litigation than other
parties, a total prohibition on claim sales is not a narrowly tailored
response. A more tailored approach would be to estimate the amount of the
externality, perhaps as a function of legal expenditures, and charge claim
purchasers that amount, just as other externalities are addressed through
taxes. I do not mean to advocate a tax on claim sales. If it is desirable to
crack down on certain abusive practices in litigation, charging only people
who sell their legal claims is a woefully under- and overinclusive means to
accomplishing this. Many litigants who do not sell their claims are
136. An argument that such selection would be ineffective in intimidating opposing litigants
into settlement is that lawyers have ethical duties to clients, including the duty to present them
with settlement offers. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. (2004). It is an
empirical question how much such ethical rules restrain attorneys from acting aggressively, but
my suspicion is that the effect is modest, at least where a client has chosen an attorney specifically
for aggressiveness. The lawyer's duties are difficult to police, in part because clients rely heavily
on advice of counsel in determining whether to settle a case.
137. One possible reason for this, however, is that state law sometimes permits sanctions
against insurance companies that fail to settle coverage disputes. See, e.g., Thomas P. Billings,
The Massachusetts Law of Unfair Insurance Claim Settlement Practices, 76 MASS. L. REV. 55, 66
(1991). Another explanation is that it is costly to challenge fraudulent or exaggerated claims, and
so insurance companies respond by only offering contracts that systematically undercompensate
the insured. See Keith J. Crocker & Sharon Tennyson, Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims
Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L. & ECON. 469, 470 (2002) (arguing that this is particularly true in
contexts in which it is easier for claimants to exaggerate losses, as a way of deterring fraud).
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aggressive, and presumably some claim purchasers would be eager to
minimize litigation costs and work cooperatively. Nonetheless, it would
make more sense to allow claim sales and impose a tax on frequent litigants
than to bar claim sales altogether, because it is repeat-player purchasers
who prompt the possibility of greater aggressiveness. If a tax seems like a
blunt response to the hazard of litigation abuse, a ban on alienation is even
blunter. There are myriad proposals to reduce litigation abuse, 138 and while
these approaches may have problems, a prohibition on claim sales seems
among the least tailored remedies.
Though the possibility that an inalienability rule might be responsive to
a potential externality is probably the most significant economic argument
with respect to legal claims, Calabresi and Melamed consider several other
arguments for inalienability generally. A related argument is that the sale
itself might produce a negative externality because third parties' utility
might be impaired by observation of the sale or its result. "If Taney is
allowed to sell himself into slavery, or to take undue risks of becoming
penniless, or to sell a kidney, Marshall may be harmed," they argue,
"simply because Marshall is a sensitive man who is made unhappy by
seeing slaves, paupers, or persons who die because they have sold a
kidney., 139 Calabresi and Melamed label this category of cases as involving
"moralisms,"'140 and this word helps explain why the argument is unlikely to
be applicable to the sale of legal claims. We have already considered and
rejected the moral arguments against claim sales, and concern that people
might be bothered by any perceived immorality in such sales seems like an
even smaller problem. Sale of legal claims might well make some people
uncomfortable, but this discomfort seems like a small public policy
consideration, even within the realm of concerns about the legal system.
Other arguments offered by Calabresi and Melamed for inalienability
are less applicable to legal claims. They note, for example, that paternalism
may justify inalienability, if individuals who would sell an entitlement
would not be acting in their own self-interest. 41 Yet there is little reason to
138. One significant debate examines and compares the American and British rules for
allocating legal costs. See generally James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and
Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225
(1995) (analyzing the impact of a loser-pays rule on the merit of filed claims and the level of
litigation).
139. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 127, at 1112.
140. Id.
141. This type of argument is what Calabresi and Melamed call "true paternalism,"
describing a situation in which "a person may be better off if he is prohibited from bargaining."
Id. at 1113-14. This is distinguished from "self paternalism," in which a person is precluded from
selling an asset as a way of vindicating his earlier desire to tie his hands and prevent a later sale.
Id. at 1113. Conceivably, someone might want to tie his hands to prevent a later sale of a legal
claim if purchasers of legal claims prosecuted claims less aggressively than the claimant himself
could be expected to. By tying his hands, the potential plaintiff would reduce the chance that the
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think this argument applicable to sale of legal claims. It is conceivable that
purchasers might try to induce plaintiffs to sell claims for lower than the
market rate or to induce defendants to pay the purchasers more than they
would need to pay someone else to take on the claim, but the argument that
sellers need protecting could be made in any market setting. It is
particularly inappropriate here because the relatively high value of legal
claims would give litigants strong incentives to find a good deal. Calabresi
and Melamed also note that an inalienability rule might be defended on
distributional grounds; for example, a rule barring sale of babies might be
made because it "makes poorer those who can cheaply produce babies and
richer those who through some nonmarket device get free an 'unwanted'
baby.'1 2 This distributional argument seems weak in the absence of a
reason to care especially about those who can cheaply produce babies, but
one might worry if claim alienation benefited the rich at the expense of the
poor. If anything, however, claim alienation should disproportionately
benefit the poor by making it more feasible for the liquidity constrained to
undertake litigation.
Calabresi and Melamed, of course, do not have the last word on the
economics of inalienability. Susan Rose-Ackerman has offered a rich and
detailed elaboration of inalienability, 143 while Richard Epstein has offered
some theories of his own in commenting on Rose-Ackerman's work.
I nn
Rose-Ackerman begins by offering a taxonomy of entitlements that
structures her later analysis. Entitlements may differ with respect to "the
question of who may hold the entitlement," namely "(a) anyone, (b) only
some specified groups, (c) everyone simultaneously, or (d) no one.' 45
Entitlements also may differ with respect to whether the law may impose
restrictions on the exercise of the entitlement, by permitting, requiring, or
forbidding some activity. 146 Finally, entitlements may differ with respect to
whether transfers through sale and gift are permitted.147 In the case of a
potential defendant would engage in an act, such as committing a tort, leading to the plaintiff
having a legal claim. Though conceivable under certain sets of circumstances, the hypothetical at
most suggests that people should be able to opt out irrevocably from a regime allowing sale of
legal claims.
142. Id. at 1114. Calabresi and Melamed argue that the possibility "suggests that direct
distributional motives may lie behind asserted nondistributional grounds for inalienability." Id.
143. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 931 (1985).
144. Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985).
145. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 143, at 933.
146. Id. at 934. Rose-Ackerman breaks this category down further by recognizing that more
than one activity might be relevant for a particular entitlement. For example, she discusses "a
zoning law in a community that also regulates historic buildings," thus preventing certain kinds of
changes to the building while also affirmatively requiring historic preservation. Id.
147. With this category, there are four possibilities, because whether sales are permitted or
forbidden may be independent of whether gifts are permitted or forbidden. For example, Rose-
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legal claim, the current rule in most jurisdictions with respect to a personal
tort claim is that only someone who has a cause of action can possess the
claim; that some activities (like prosecuting the claim) may be required;
148
and, most relevantly, that the claim cannot be bought or sold.
14 9
Given this taxonomy, the most relevant of Rose-Ackerman's
explanations for inalienability can be applied: imperfect information. Rose-
Ackerman notes that a defense of the "modified inalienability" rule for
blood may be a function of imperfect information. "If it is difficult for
hospitals to judge whether blood contains the damaging hepatitis virus," she
writes, "then ideally one would design a collection system that gives
contributors an incentive to reveal any past cases of hepatitis."' 5 ° A similar
informational problem might be present in the case of lawsuits. If someone
can sell a lawsuit, then the profit motive may lead even those with poor
claims to bring suits. An answer to this objection depends in part on
whether the market for sale of claims will be worse than the legal system
itself at identifying bad claims.15' The analogy implies, however, that if we
want only plaintiffs with good claims to bring lawsuits, we should allow
transfer of claims through gift. Indeed, because profit is a motive in
litigation even without the sale of claims, we should perhaps consider
allowing lawsuits only where a plaintiff has given the lawsuit away without
consideration. It is possible to imagine such a scheme,' and it might
succeed at weeding out frivolous claims. But the distance between such a
scheme and existing legal practice suggests that inalienability rules cannot
be explained as intended to limit the courts to altruistic lawsuits, though it is
plausible that inalienability rules decrease the incidence of frivolous suits.
Another analogy is to the Homesteading Acts, 153 which allowed settlers
to acquire land for a small fee if they worked the land for five years but
which prohibited sales or gifts of the land within that five-year period.
Rose-Ackerman's explanation for this approach, as opposed to a straight
Ackerman labels cases in which sales are forbidden but gifts are permitted (such as the donation
of a kidney) as "modified inalienability." Id. at 935.
148. See, e.g., Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1979)
(discussing the equitable doctrine of laches).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
150. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 143, at 945-46.
151. See infra Subsection lI.C.1.
152. For example, plaintiffs might be required to donate those lawsuits they wished to
alienate to a government corporation that would then auction them off to the highest bidder. A
plaintiff, even if reimbursed for the costs of donating the claim (such as appearing in court),
presumably would donate such claim only to advance the cause of justice, not for personal gain.
That is, a plaintiff donating a claim presumably would be doing so because she derived some
utility from helping the public or at least from hurting the alleged wrongdoer.
153. Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (repealed 1976); Homestead Act
of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976).
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auction,1 54 is a network externality story.155 Each inhabitant produced
benefits for other inhabitants,' 56 just as each owner of a VCR produces
benefits for other owners by encouraging the development of video
stores. 157 Litigation may have network externality properties because, for
example, the development of precedent in one case may allow for easier
resolution of a dispute in another. 158 Although I consider later whether
allowing alienability of claims is likely to have an adverse effect on
precedent, 59 once again completion of the analogy reveals its flaws.160 Our
legal system does not penalize litigants for settling before trial or give
bonuses to those who take their claims to trial. While it is conceivable that
such policies might be appropriate, the prevailing belief seems to be that
our legal system would benefit if the total costs of litigation were lower, 16 1
and this belief seems consistent with the operation of the legal system.
154. For an alternative explanation of why auctions and other sales gave way to
homesteading, see Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. &
ECON. 393, 414-15 (1995) (arguing that it became increasingly difficult for the government to sell
land in remote and inhospitable areas).
155. Rose-Ackerman does not characterize it as such, because the literature on network
externalities arose after her article, but her argument is prescient. See generally Mark A. Lemley
& David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479
(1998) (discussing the implications of network externalities for antitrust and other areas of law);
S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133 (evaluating the definition of network externalities). Rose-Ackerman
characterizes the story as a prisoners' dilemma. "Everyone is better off if all settle than if no one
settles, but if others settle, then it is best for each person to wait until others have overcome the
initial hardships." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 143, at 958.
156. The benefits produced by an increased number of settlers included assistance in
emergencies, sharing of labor and equipment, and population concentration that permitted greater
political and economic power. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 143, at 957-58.
157. See, e.g., Lemley & McGowan, supra note 155, at 592 (discussing network effects in the
VCR market).
158. Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner have emphasized network externalities in the
choice of corporate form and contract terms, because a decision by one firm to make a particular
choice confers a network benefit on other firms making the same choice. See Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics
of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law,
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). But see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (2001)
(arguing that the popularity cf the LLC form relative to the LLP form is inconsistent with the
Kahan-Klausner hypothesis).
159. See infra Subsection II.C.2.b.
160. The analogy may be normatively flawed as well. Epstein argues that no inalienability
rule was needed to ensure efficient land use because less restrictive alternatives existed, like
selling only large parcels so that speculators would internalize the costs of overly slow
development. Epstein, supra note 144, at 989.
161. It may well be that society would like lower litigation costs but would rather achieve this
objective through fewer suits being brought than through a smaller percentage of cases being
tried. Nonetheless, the absence of incentives to bring cases to trial at least suggests that under
current conditions, settlement should not be discarded. Those who decry settlement thus seem to
be advocating a minority viewpoint. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that "settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and
should be neither encouraged nor praised"); cf Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why
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Rose-Ackerman also defends the inalienability aspects of voting rules
and mandatory jury service. Voters cannot sell their votes;162 venirepersons
cannot hire others to take their spots on a jury. The concern is that allowing
alienation of votes and jury service would affect not only seller and
purchaser but also society at large.1 63 The point, which lies at the
intersection of economic and democratic theory, describes a negative
consequence of rent-seeking behavior. Even if the purchasing of votes
entails relatively few transaction costs, thus meaning that there is no direct
rent-seeking effect, the danger is that those votes might be used for personal
benefit at the expense of economic efficiency more broadly. Allowing vote
sales might be more efficient than allowing lobbying, but there is at least
the possibility that vote sales would lead to inefficient results that would not
be achievable with other forms of rent seeking.
One might similarly argue that litigants are providing inputs into a
process, and allowing a sale of a claim might corrupt that process, resulting
in worse decisions for society as a whole and thus a negative externality.
The problem with this argument is that our legal system is adversarial; it is
based on the premise that litigants will adequately represent their own
interests. The argument may explain why we do not allow private
prosecution of criminal cases; prosecutors are supposed to represent social
interests rather than the interest of achieving a maximum sentence.'
64
Similarly, the argument provides an easy explanation for laws against
bribing judges. But, given a system in which litigants already have
incentives to pursue their financial interests, it is difficult to understand on
economic grounds why they should be prevented from alienating their
claims to parties whose interests would exist solely as the result of the
economic transaction.
These arguments all proceed on the basis that litigants themselves
would prefer to be able to alienate their claims. Yet, one might argue,
potential adversaries might prefer in some circumstances to agree not to
Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 221 (1999) (constructing a model illustrating the cost of settlement in terms of the
production of precedent).
162. For a general theory helping to explain the prohibition on selling of votes, see Saul
Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 111 (2000).
163. Rose-Ackerman explains that "the value of a representative democracy depends upon
citizens making responsible, well-informed choices." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 143, at 963.
This concern may be sufficient to outweigh the competing concern that "voting is an individual,
private act that should not be examined too closely by the state." Id. Similarly, she states that the
legal process "itself might be undermined ifjuries were staffed entirely by volunteers." Id. at 965.
Those who would agree to serve on a jury, for payment from the government or from others,
might not be representative of the community as a whole.
164. Private prosecution does occur in some other countries, such as the United Kingdom.
See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
357, 365-66 (1986).
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allow alienation of claims, as manifested in contractual bars on claim
assignment. Just as private parties are sometimes willing in contract to limit
assignability, perhaps the ban in the tort context reflects a hypothetical
contract that potential tortfeasors and victims would have agreed to if given
the chance. 65 Epstein, for example, observes that in a contractual context,
"[t]he promisee is a known quantity chosen and selected by the promisor,"
and "[e]ven if the legal system gives the promisor the same rights against
the promisee's assignee, the value of those rights still may be reduced by
the assignment," because the promisor loses "informal leverage" against the
assignee. 166 In game-theoretic terms, parties in an iterated relationship may
be able to resolve disputes relatively cheaply because of their mutual
interest in cooperating beyond the context of any particular dispute. 167 Such
reasoning may in turn justify default rules, such as the general rule that
easements in gross are inalienable. 168 This reasoning, however, does not
appear to justify inalienability of tort claims involving parties who have not
had a chance to contract with each other. It is precisely in such cases that
parties will be least likely to have dealings with each other unrelated to the
lawsuit, so a default rule preventing alienation cannot be presumed to be
what the parties would have desired had they had an opportunity to contract
on the issue.
B. The Affirmative Economic Case for Alienability
1. Alienation by Plaintiffs
A simple argument for allowing plaintiffs to sell claims for money
damages is that they will be able to recover more quickly. 169 Instead of
waiting for the litigation process to conclude, a plaintiff can receive cash
from anyone willing to buy the claim and may use such cash either to pay
165. The construct of the hypothetical contract is often used in tort theory for contexts in
which ex ante contracting would be impractical. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products
Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357-60 (1988).
166. Epstein, supra note 144, at 982.
167. Cf David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners'
Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245, 245-47 (1982) (suggesting that cooperation may be possible
even in a game with a finite number of periods). A problem with this theory as applied to
assignability is that if such parties should be able to resolve disputes effectively because of the
danger of impairing relations, then they should be able to do so before a party assigns a claim. If a
contracting party would temper its aggressiveness in resolving a particular dispute because of a
desire to ensure friendly relations on other issues, then surely such a party would not make an
irrevocable assignment of a claim, which presumably would damage relations if the assignee were
an aggressive litigator.
168. Epstein, supra note 144, at 984. Epstein acknowledges, however, that "there is some
question whether the prohibition is necessary to protect the interest of the landowner." !d.
169. See, e.g., Choharis, supra note 1, at 444.
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for the costs being sued for or for other purposes. It might seem that
plaintiffs should be indifferent between receiving an immediate payment
and receiving a later one, as long as the court provides for pre- and
postjudgment interest. Even jurisdictions that provide for such interest,
however, do not tailor the amount .of interest awarded to a particular
plaintiffs discount rate. 170 Some tort plaintiffs face liquidity problems,
particularly if they face unexpected bills attributable to the tort, such as
medical expenses, and their discount rate may be higher than the
prejudgment interest rate. As long as the purchaser of the claim has a lower
discount rate, a sale moves the claim to a higher-valuing owner.
Equally significantly, a plaintiff's decision to sell a claim eliminates the
risk to the plaintiff, at least if the claim is sold in its entirety. Claims may be
uncertain because the law is unclear, because facts are unknown, or because
it is unclear how a judge or jury would apply the law to the facts. 71 Sale of
a claim, of course, does not eliminate any of these risks, but merely
transfers them to another party. A tort claim, however, will often be a
significant asset in a plaintiff's portfolio, while a purchaser of tort claims
may be able to diversify-for example, by purchasing a variety of different
tort claims, some of which will be more successful than others. Plaintiffs
will surely pay a premium, in the form of a reduction in the amount
received, for moving the risk onto the purchasers of the claims. But in a
competitive market, the premium should be equal to the burden of the risk
on the purchaser rather than to that on the seller. Even if there were a
monopoly purchaser of legal claims, the risk premium would ordinarily be
between the burden of the risk on the plaintiff and the burden of the risk on
the purchaser, because the plaintiff and purchaser would have to negotiate a
fee that benefited both.
The plaintiffs reduction in risk may represent an increase in the
accuracy of the legal system in providing compensation to tort claimants.
One advocate of allowing sales of tort claims has noted that the resolution
of a claim at trial "may be very idiosyncratic, with jury awards varying
considerably for similar injuries."'7 2 By chance, some juries may be more
sympathetic to a plaintiff than others, in determining both the validity of the
plaintiff's claim and the size of the award. Similarly, different judges (or
even the same judge on different days) may resolve the same legal issue
170. See, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.003 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2004-2005)
(explaining the calculation of postjudgment interest).
171. The inconsistency of both punitive and compensatory damage assessments, especially
for nonpecuniary harms, has produced proposals for systematizing damages decisions. See, e.g.,
David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for
the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive
Damages, 80 IOWA L. REv. 1109 (1995).
172. Choharis, supra note 1, at 468.
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differently, and different judges may make different decisions on how the
parties are allowed to present evidence. Even a claim that is settled may
reflect the identity of the judge assigned to hear the case. The price at which
a claim is sold, assuming it is sold before a judge is selected, will reflect an
expected value of the judgment, and it will thus be an average of what
different decisionmakers would be expected to decide. If accuracy is
defined as what the average decisionmaker would decide, 173 sales of claims
may well produce more accurate results than complete litigation.
The improvement in accuracy from eliminating decisionmaker bias, of
course, must be balanced with any market imperfections that may cause the
price of claims to deviate from their expected value. Perhaps buyers will
systematically fail to notice some feature of the claim that may affect its
value, even though that feature ultimately would be discovered in litigation.
Buyers, however, will have incentives to price claims accurately,
particularly if there are many prospective buyers of a claim. Plaintiffs will
have incentives to share any information that might show that their claims
are more valuable than otherwise might be thought, and buyers will have
incentives to seek out claim weaknesses. Sometimes, some information that
would affect claim valuation in a trial might not be revealed, but this is a
problem of settlement as well, and at least prices will reflect estimates of
how much claims would be worth given available information.
Advocates of permitting plaintiffs to sell claims argue that "the sale of
tort claims will almost always provide tort victims with greater
compensation than would be available under the present tort system."'
174
Because purchasers are likely to be parties who can prosecute legal claims
efficiently, the net value of the claim is higher with those purchasers than
when tort victims prosecute the claim themselves. For example, "where
claims are too small to litigate independently, claimants will be able to sell
them to investors who can consolidate them and pursue the claims
economically."'' 75 The opportunity to alienate a claim to any third party
rather than only to the defendant should make the plaintiff better off or at
least no worse off, absent plaintiff irrationality. Although sale prices might
be lower than judgments, the difference presumably would reflect the cost
of prosecution, including risk.
An opponent of alienability might argue that plaintiffs can already
achieve many of the benefits of selling claims by hiring attorneys on
173. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review
of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 531-32 (2002) (noting that the averaging
function of group decisionmaking tends to dampen errors attributable to idiosyncratic
assessments).
174. Choharis, supra note 1, at 480.
175. Id. at 481 (footnote omitted).
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contingency fee. 1 76 Indeed, hiring of contingency fee counsel reduces the
risk to plaintiffs of bringing litigation, because at least the plaintiffs need
not worry about losing the lawsuit and being out attorney's fees.
Contingency fees, however, do not eliminate the risk of litigation
altogether, or even very much. Moreover, markets for contingency lawyers
exhibit little price competition, in part because litigants may interpret a low
contingency fee as a signal of a low-quality lawyer.1 77 In addition,
contingency fees can create tensions between optimal strategies for the
lawyer and the client. 78 A lawyer may have a greater incentive to settle a
case if he will bear the cost of preparing the case 179 or a lesser incentive if
he is less risk-averse than the client,' 80 and the incentives will cancel out
only by happenstance.181 Professional responsibility rules seek to ensure
that a lawyer will act in the client's best interest, and those rules may, to
some extent, align incentives, but they are surely imperfect. If a legal claim
is sold in its entirety, however, the new owner of the claim will be acting
entirely in her own interest.182 Although she may hire a lawyer to actually
prosecute the claim rather than pursuing it pro se, she will presumably be in
the business of buying claims and thus be in a better position to monitor the
lawyer and reduce the danger of agency costs.
The legal claims market is also likely to steer claims to the lawyers who
are best suited to bring them. The process of seeking out a contingency fee
lawyer may provide some information to plaintiffs about whether they have
viable claims, as contingency fee lawyers will reject claims not worth their
effort. In a market for legal claims, the prices that buyers offer would
provide plaintiffs with an assessment of the value of their claims and an
176. Cf Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a
Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 631-32 (1995) (noting parallels between
contingency fees and claim sales and suggesting that nonlawyer competition through claim sales
may reduce problems associated with contingency fees).
177. See Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It
Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZo L. REV. 65, 101-02 (2003).
178. See, e.g., Painter, supra note 176, at 670-78.
179. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD.
189, 200-02 (1987); Andre L. Smith, Comment, Consumer Boycotts Versus Civil Litigation: A
Rudimentary Efficiency Analysis, 43 HOW. L.J. 213, 226 (2000).
180. For a discussion of how relative risk aversion affects contracting between lawyers and
clients, see George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly
Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 110-11.
181. For an analysis of how contingency fee arrangements affect claim values, see Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like To Pay for That? The Strategic
Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 53, 59-61 (1996).
182. The price of the claim will, of course, reflect the cost of prosecuting it. One recent
commentator has suggested that courts setting attorney's fees should do so by reference to
markets for legal claims, recognizing that private arrangements may reflect optimal decisions on
attorney compensation. See George B. Murr, Analysis of the Valuation of Attorney Work Product
According to the Market for Claims: Reformulating the Lodestar Method, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
599, 627-30 (2000).
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indication of which third parties are best situated to prosecute the claims.
Though it will not always be the best lawyer who offers the most for a
claim-top attorneys will not waste their time on claims that they consider
trivial-the third party who purchases a claim is presumably the party who
can maximize its value, taking into account the value of the third party's
time. A contingency percentage offered, by contrast, is not necessarily a
good indication of the likelihood of success of a particular contingency fee
lawyer. 183  Contingency fees are remarkably constant in particular
geographic regions across lawyers,184 and there is thus no obvious
relationship between fees and lawyer quality. 185 Though contingency fees
may help assure that claims are efficiently assigned to lawyers, a market for
legal claims is likely to accomplish this task better.
186
Sale of legal claims also may produce more efficient lawyering than
contingency fees because purchasers of large claims may be able to obtain
financing more easily than contingency fee lawyers. 187 The market for
contingency fee lawyers is effectively restricted to firms that can afford
large risks, and the size of contingency fees reflects the risks that their
lawyers assume. Although large risks are commonplace in the world of
business, where, for example, venture capitalists are willing to suffer a
number of losers in exchange for one winner, lawyers in firms may not be
well diversified. Professional responsibility rules may limit the ability of
law firms to securitize claims or to obtain other forms of speculative
financing.188 Because the purchasers of legal claims would be prosecuting
those claims on their own behalf, these restrictions presumably would not
apply. A corporation could easily be established to prosecute a single large
claim, and its shares could even be publicly traded, to further facilitate
183. Contingency fees may help a lawyer signal to a client that the lawyer believes the
client's case is relatively strong. See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 595, 624 (1993) (considering criminal cases in particular but offering a
generalizable point). They do not, however, signal the lawyer's quality to the client in the same
way that hourly fees do. See Brickman, supra note 177, at 96-97 (discussing the difficulty that
contingency fee plaintiffs face in choosing lawyers).
184. Brickman, supra note 177, at 78-86 (discussing the uniformity of contingency fee
pricing).
185. Better, or more reputable, lawyers tend to earn more money not because they charge
higher contingency fees but because they take on more valuable cases. See Michael Abramowicz,
IHow Lawyers Compete, REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 38, 39. The contingency fee system thus
depends on clients identifying the best lawyers and lawyers identifying the best clients, but does
not itself promote the efficient allocation of clients to lawyers.
186. Prospective assignees, meanwhile, are unlikely to purchase claims with a relatively low
probability of success. See Luthy, supra note 1, at 1011 ("[O]n a case-by-case basis, an assignee
should have even stronger incentives to seek meritorious claims than would a lawyer working on
contingency; if she should lose the suit, the assignee will lose not only her time and litigation
expenses but also whatever consideration she provided to the assignor.").
187. Choharis, supra note 1, at 444-45.
188. The relevant prohibition is that on champerty. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3, at 79-83
(describing litigation support firms and their legal status).
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diversification of risk. The corporation could then hire lawyers to
accomplish the prosecution. Naturally, not every claim purchase would
accord with this approach-buyers would have to weigh the costs of such
financing as well as the agency costs of paying salaries rather than
contingency fees to lawyers-but the possibility of such financing might
increase the net receipts of many plaintiffs.
Such creative financing might be particularly important in mass
litigation involving many plaintiffs suing a single or small number of
defendants. One justification for the class action device is that it serves to
consolidate claims within a single law firm. A concern that the Supreme
Court has voiced about class actions is that when the same lawyer serves
different plaintiffs, she will face conflicts of interest and may treat the
plaintiffs inequitably. 189 One answer to this dilemma is subclassing, 190
which allows different lawyers to represent different groups of plaintiffs,
but even this tool will be effective only when the significant distinctions
among plaintiffs are easily measured. If individual plaintiffs could sell legal
claims, purchasers would have an incentive to buy large numbers of related
claims, assuming this produces economies of scale. Subclassing would
likely naturally develop as different firms specialized in different types of
plaintiffs' claims, but even if it did not, there would be no concern with
conflicts of interest, because claim owners would press only claims that
they owned. Competition among purchasers would limit the risk that some
plaintiffs would be treated better than others for reasons extrinsic to the
merits of their claims. Claim sales thus may allow for efficient prosecution
of claims when the class action device is unavailable due to conflict of
interest.
These considerations all suggest that the sale of claims should be
allowed because it would benefit plaintiffs. Defendants, unless vindictive,
should not mind that the sale of a legal claim allows a plaintiff to transfer
risk. Nevertheless, if transfers of claims allow plaintiffs to obtain better
representation or to bring claims that otherwise would not be worth
bringing, defendants are made worse off (though they might be better off in
a regime that also allowed defendants to alienate claims). It might thus
seem that many of the benefits to plaintiffs are offset by the cost to
defendants and that the reforms are more or less a wash. This criticism
shows that analyzing benefits to plaintiffs provides an incomplete analysis,
but it does not counter any of the arguments for the sale of claims.
Moreover, the goal of the legal system is not to benefit plaintiffs and
defendants equally but to compensate plaintiffs and deter potential
189. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997).
190. See, e.g., id. at 626; SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group (In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group), 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992) (approving settlement involving subclasses).
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tortfeasors who later become defendants. Allowing the sale of claims may
increase deterrence if some plaintiffs who do not wish to bring legal actions
themselves are willing to sell their claims. This may be the case if some
potential plaintiffs are averse to the risks inherent in the legal process or
simply cannot find a suitable attorney to bring a claim. When victims fail to
bring claims against those who have violated the standard of care and
caused injury, the injurers will not internalize the costs, so an innovation
that facilitates the filing of legitimate claims may produce social benefits.
Although punitive damages in theory might be able to ensure perfect
deterrence even if only some claims are brought, 19' they generally do not
depend on the probability of detection and prosecution, 92 so encouraging
the filing of all claims may be a more feasible way of improving deterrence,
one goal of a legal system. The legal system should be concerned about
frivolous claims and about the danger that innocent defendants may be
forced to spend money in defense, but prohibiting sale of claims is as likely
to discourage meritorious as nonmeritorious claims.
2. Alienation by Defendants
Although the literature to date has focused only on alienation by
plaintiffs, the arguments apply also to alienation by defendants, i.e., to
payments by defendants to third parties to take over their claims. There are
two significant caveats, though both arguments suggest only that the
benefits of alienation may be somewhat smaller for defendants, not that
benefits do not exist. First, defendants on average may face lesser liquidity
constraints than plaintiffs, at least in tort cases. Second, the defendant may
be able to spend the sum of money whose ownership the plaintiff has called
into question, at least until a final judgment orders the defendant to pay the
money to the plaintiff. Where the defendant's liquidity is at issue, however,
the plaintiff may have limited ability to stop the defendant from spending
the money, pursuant to the provisional remedies of attachment and
garnishment. 
193
Translation of most of the specific reasons discussed above to the
defendant context verifies the intuition that defendants also could benefit
191. This can occur, commentators have argued, if the punitive damages multiple is the
inverse of the probability of detection. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for
Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1149-53 (1989); A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
192. See W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail To Promote Efficiency, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 139, 159-63 (2002) (finding that mock jurors cannot reliably follow jury
instructions that require them to use the multiplier approach).
193. See generally LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 598-601 (3d
ed. 2004) (providing an overview of the use of these provisional remedies).
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from alienation. Just as plaintiffs might benefit from recovering money
more quickly, so too might defendants benefit from the potentially faster
resolution of claims in the market than in litigation. Facing a lawsuit with
an uncertain judgment may hamstring a corporation's ability to obtain
financing in the capital markets, because lenders may be concerned that
their loans will end up going to pay the plaintiffs and that the defendant will
be unable to repay them. In some cases, a corporation that alienates a claim
may be able to demonstrate to creditors that it will succeed in avoiding
bankruptcy. Even for corporations not on the verge of bankruptcy, litigation
may represent a significant risk that is difficult to diversify, just as legal
claims represent significant assets in plaintiffs' portfolios. The amount
sought by any individual plaintiff may be small relative to the assets of a
defendant, but if many plaintiffs bring similar suits against the defendant,
then its losses from the suits are likely to be correlated. To the extent that a
defendant's liability may depend especially on the decision of a single
court, because it might set a significant precedent, for example, alienation
may increase the accuracy of the finding of the defendant's liability, just as
with the plaintiff's.' 94 In addition, alienation will steer defendants' as well
as plaintiffs' claims toward those who can represent them most efficiently.
Alienation by defendants thus might harm plaintiffs, just as the reverse is
true, but a goal of the legal system is to avoid overdeterrence and thus to
encourage meritorious defenses, and the same arguments for making
litigation more efficient apply.
C. The Economic Counterargument
This Section builds a set of economic arguments suggesting drawbacks
of an alienability regime that may offset the advantages discussed above.
The first problem, documented in Subsection 1, is that asymmetric
information about the quality of legal claims may make sales of claims rare.
This argument might appear merely to indicate that the benefits of claim
alienation are smaller than one might otherwise think, but the argument is
also important because it is likely to make other economic problems with
alienability more severe.1 95 In particular, the danger that alienation of
claims might interfere with legal process or discourage settlement, as
explained in Subsections I and 2, is likely to be more serious when only a
relatively small number of claims are alienated. The ultimate economic
balance is thus uncertain. While robust legal claims markets might produce
194. See supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text.
195. At least one commentator has argued that assignment of claims should be permissible
even if a deep market for claims does not develop. See Luthy, supra note 1, at 1024.
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considerable benefits, costs might exceed benefits in the thin trading
markets that adverse selection problems are likely to produce.
1. The Lemons Problem
a. The Theoretical Problem
A market for claims is likely to be beset by an adverse selection or
"lemons" problem. 96 Just as potential sellers of used cars have better
information about the quality of their vehicles than can be assessed easily
by other parties, 197 so too do the original parties to a dispute have unique
access to information about their claims. Thus, if alienation is allowed,
parties who choose to alienate their claims will not be a random sample of
all parties, but those who anticipate that buyers will most overvalue their
claims relative to other claims. Although unable to value individual claims
accurately, buyers will recognize that the claims being alienated are
generally of lower quality than other claims, just as used-car buyers
recognize that used cars being sold are generally worse than those not being
sold. Buyers will discount their offers correspondingly. This discounting
will mean that some claim owners who believed, because of asymmetric
information, that their claims would be valued highly relative to the
universe of all claims will decide not to alienate their claims after all. This
phenomenon will tend to make the pool of claims being alienated even
worse, leading to steeper price discounting by buyers, more owners
deciding not to alienate their claims, and so on.
Adverse selection can cause markets to unravel completely, 198 or the
effect can be more modest, with an equilibrium in which some cases are
alienated and some cases are not. There is a used-car market, after all, but
presumably not as robust a market as there would be if used cars could be
objectively, accurately, and costlessly valued. Similarly, if alienation of
legal claims were allowed, some legal claims would be alienated. There are
reasons, however, to think that the market in legal claims would be thin.
Even more than with used cars, a legal claim is a form of property in which
asymmetric information is commonplace.' 99 A party might, for example,
196. The seminal article is George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
197. Id. at 489 ("After owning a specific car.., the car owner can form a good idea of the
quality of this machine; i.e., the owner assigns a new probability to the event that his car is a
lemon.").
198. Id. at 490.
199. For an analysis of the impact of asymmetric information on litigation and settlement, see
Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75.
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suspect that a particular witness will give damaging testimony, or it might
simply know a number of tangential details about a transaction that
cumulatively would justify a belief that a court would not be favorable.
Even if this is true-in only a relatively small percentage of cases, the effect
might be enough to limit alienation of claims significantly.
A purchaser of a legal claim could insist that the alienator promise to
turn over all relevant information and agree to pay appropriate damages for
failure to turn over such information. 200 This would limit the possibility that
an alienator could hide a smoking gun. Such contracts, however, might be
difficult to draft and enforce. If a plaintiff is to reduce the risk of
uncertainty from trial, she could not retain all risk that new information
might affect the value of the claim. The plaintiff at least presumably would
want to limit such an agreement to information that she knew about.
Knowledge, however, may be difficult to verify ex post, and much
knowledge about the strength of a case consists of intuitions and inferences
rather than hard facts. In this sense, the market for legal claims again would
be like the market for used cars. A car owner might know whether the car is
a lemon, but such knowledge might be difficult for a subsequent purchaser
of the car to prove.
Aggravating the adverse selection problem in the legal context is that
one form of alienation is permitted-settlement. A third party who
purchases a plaintiff's claim not only must worry that the plaintiff might
withhold information but also must wonder why the defendant did not offer
a better deal than the third party. The defendant, after all, also is likely to
have an informational advantage over the third party. Third parties are
likely to purchase claims only when they expect to profit from doing so,
even taking into account the costs of researching and developing the claim.
In such situations, however, a defendant would ordinarily have an incentive
to offer a more attractive deal than the third party if the third party was not
overpaying.
The third party would recognize that if the plaintiff accepts the third
party's offer to purchase the claim, the plaintiff was unable to get a better
deal from the defendant, indicating that in any consummated transaction,
the defendant, who has better information than the third party, will believe
that the third party overpaid. Even if the third party strongly believed that
the defendant was wrong or unwilling to settle for other reasons, the fact of
the defendant's prior reluctance to settle means that settlement is less likely
than it usually is, and the greater-than-normal expected cost of litigation
makes the claim even less valuable. Third parties, of course, could spend
200. See infra text accompanying note 255 (discussing this issue in the context of a
mandatory-alienation regime).
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money to verify legal claims, such as by investigating background facts and
soliciting affidavits before agreeing to alienation. Such verification,
however, is likely to be expensive, and the cost may be prohibitive if the
original party retains the right not to alienate the claim at all.2°1
b. A Simulation Model
Adverse selection is thus likely to pose a substantially more severe
obstacle to alienation than asymmetric information generally poses to
settlement. There may, however, be some cases in which third parties are
more optimistic than the litigants from whom they would alienate, or in
which third parties have substantial advantages in litigation costs. Perhaps
in these circumstances, the adverse selection problem can be overcome. To
better evaluate the relevant dynamics, I designed a relatively simple
simulation featuring a plaintiff, a defendant, and a third party who play a
litigation game.2 °2
Each time the game is played, the computer chooses, from a uniform
distribution between 0 and 1, the probability that a decisionmaker would
eventually find for the plaintiff, as well as the actual case outcome based on
this probability. The players do not know these numbers, but each
estimates, with some error, the probability. In some fraction of cases, the
plaintiff or the defendant has secret information about the likely outcome of
the case, and that party's estimate then moves halfway to the actual
outcome (0 or 1). In the game, each player selects a price for the claim
based on her optimal strategy.2 °3 If the defendant's price is the highest, then
the claim is settled at that price, and no litigation costs are incurred. If the
third party's price is the highest, then the claim is alienated at that price,
and the third party and the defendant bear fixed litigation costs. If the
201. A standard result of auction theory is that bidders depress their bids to take into account
not only the cost of investigating the particular auction but also the probability that the
investigation will not lead to a completed purchase. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Robert G.
Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
423, 450-52 (1993).
202. The C++ source code for this simulation is available on request from the author.
203. Optimality is determined by an iterative process repeated over 200 rounds. In each
round, each player plays the game 5000 times and tests out three strategies for announcing a price
based on the estimate: a baseline strategy, a strategy to announce a slightly higher price than the
baseline, and a strategy to announce a slightly lower price than the baseline. (Each player also has
a separate set of strategies for situations in which she has received secret information.) The most
effective of these strategies becomes the player's new baseline, and this baseline strategy is then
used against the other players when they choose their strategy in each round. This approach does
not guarantee a unique equilibrium for any given set of parameters, because each player's strategy
depends on the strategy of other players. As a result, the entire simulation must be run repeatedly
to produce relatively consistent results.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005]
746 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114:697
plaintiffs price is the highest, there is no settlement or alienation, and the
plaintiff and the defendant thus bear litigation costs.
Figure 1 illustrates the result of the simulation for one set of plausible
parameters. 204 The x-axis represents the litigation-cost discount of the third
party; at the left of the x-axis, the third party bears the same litigation cost
as the plaintiff or the defendant, while at the right of the x-axis, the third
party bears no litigation cost at all. The y-axis reflects the proportion of
cases that are tried by the plaintiff, settled, or alienated and tried by the
third party. The figure reveals that alienation indeed is rare, though not
entirely absent, when the litigation costs of the third party are comparable
to those of the plaintiff and the defendant. Only when the third party's
litigation costs fall to about half of those of the plaintiff and the defendant
does the alienation rate rise dramatically, largely without decreasing the
settlement rate. It would be hazardous, of course, to infer too much from
such a simple simulation. 20 5 The simulation, however, demonstrates how
adverse selection can thwart third-party alienation, as well as how very
strong third-party advantages may at some point create a tipping point
where alienation becomes quite common.
204. In this simulation, the lawsuit was worth 1.00 to the plaintiff if the plaintiff won. The
plaintiff and defendant each bore litigation costs of 0. 10 if the case was settled. The plaintiff and
the defendant had a 0.2 probability (each independent of the other's probability) of having secret
information about the case; thus, if a plaintiff's initial estimate were 0.5 in a case that the plaintiff
in fact would win, then twenty percent of the time secret information would increase the
plaintiff's estimate to 0.75. Placing aside the cases in which the plaintiff or the defendant has
secret information, each of the three parties estimates the probability with a noise factor that
produces an average absolute error in the estimate of the plaintiff's success of 0.10. To produce
Figure 1, the simulation was run 100 times and the results averaged.
205. In experimenting with parameters, increasing the accuracy of the parties' ability to
estimate the probability of the plaintiff's victory led to the increase in alienation visible in Figure
I occurring with more modest litigation-cost discounts for the third party; reducing estimate
accuracy had the reverse effect. Thus, when parties can estimate case outcomes relatively well,
and there is therefore only a small probability of asymmetric valuations, only a relatively modest
third-party litigation-cost advantage is needed to simulate creation of a market for alienation.
Increasing the proportion of cases in which the plaintiff and defendant possessed secret
information tended to flatten out the curve in Figure 1. That is, there was more alienation than in
Figure 1 in cases in which third parties had litigation costs almost as high as the litigants, and
there was less alienation than in Figure 1 in cases in which third parties had much lower litigation
costs than the litigants.
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c. Empirical Clues
How robust a market would be, given the abolition of restrictions on
alienation, is an empirical question and currently an unanswerable one. The
relative rareness of alienation of tort claims in states that appear to have
only minimal legal barriers to such alienation, such as Massachusetts and
Texas, provides the most powerful evidence that abolition of restrictions
would not lead to robust claim markets. This evidence, however, is
equivocal, because of the absence of clear law authorizing business
associations actively to seek out legal claims for purchase.20 6 As noted
earlier, in Massachusetts, the courts have seemed to suggest that
206. One context in which alienation may occur increasingly frequently is in shareholder
derivative suits. The Delaware Court of Chancery recently allowed the assignment of legal claims
concerning a merger from an unidentified number of minority shareholders to a single minority
shareholder. See In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. CIV.A. 16415, 2004 WL
1305745, at *29 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004, revised June 4, 2004). The assignment, however,
occurred before the merger agreement, see id. at * 1, potentially alleviating asymmetric
information concerns.
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syndication of lawsuits might be legally problematic,2 °7 and the prospect of
barratry prosecutions might deter. creation of such a business in Texas.2 °8
Even if there are strong reasons to suspect that such a business would
withstand legal scrutiny, the risk might make it inadvisable to start one. The
business that succeeds in such a legal challenge would bear the cost of
litigation, but presumably would not be able to prevent other businesses
from free riding on its litigation successes. 20 9 It is thus difficult to determine
whether the current absence of alienation in relatively friendly jurisdictions
is a result of adverse selection or of legal uncertainty.
There is, however, one critical datum suggesting that impediments to a
robust market in legal claims might be severe: the absence of alienation of
claims by defendants. Purchase of liability insurance is common despite
adverse selection, but asymmetric information is likely to be greater when a
legal claim has already arisen. In principle, a company could sell insurance
on a particular claim, thus allowing a defendant to reduce the risk of
litigation by transferring it onto a relatively risk-neutral party, but such
transactions seem rare. With retroactive insurance, the price of policies
would depend on the facts of individual cases, and insurance companies
would agree to defend claims and pay damages in exchange for receiving
the policy premium. 210 I have found no statutes prohibiting retroactive
insurance, and there are at least occasional purchases of retroactive
insurance, typically in the form of reinsurance by insurance carriers that
face losses. 211 The only liability insurance widely available, however,
excludes causes of action that arose before the insurance was purchased.1 2
Perhaps the most famous example of the purchase of retroactive
insurance reveals both the unique circumstances in which it is likely to be
purchased and the hazards involved. After a 1980 fire in Las Vegas's MGM
207. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
209. This may be an example in which the prospect of second-mover advantages has deterred
the creation of a business. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697, 708-10 (2001) (noting that second-mover
advantages may provide a justification for patent protection). Patent protection appears unlikely
because the idea of buying legal claims is "obvious" in the patent law sense. Cf Choharis, supra
note 1, at 479-91 (identifying the possibility that a business "Torts 'R' Us" might buy legal
claims, thus potentially destroying nonobviousness and thereby preventing subsequent issuance of
a business method patent on buying legal claims).
210. Liability insurance policies generally impose on the insurer a duty to defend. See, e.g.,
Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 638 F. Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
211. See, e.g., Andrew Bolger, Fast Fix for a Complex Deal, FIN. TiMES, Sept. 11, 2001,
Survey: Reinsurance, at VI (reporting that Berkshire Hathaway had secured a $2.4 billion
retroactive reinsurance premium for a major U.K. company).
212. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 395 (3d ed. 2000) (providing a sample commercial general liability coverage policy
covering only bodily injury or property damage during the policy period).
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Grand hotel killed more than eighty people,213 the insurer purchased
reinsurance.214 Given concerns about adverse selection, it should not be
surprising that liability was considered certain, but the original insurer
faced some risk from uncertainty about when payouts would occur.215 For a
retroactive insurance contract to be consummated, there must be enough
uncertainty to justify the administrative expense of the purchase of
insurance, but little danger of asymmetric information, and the uncertainty
about payout dates thus made this litigation seem to be a good candidate for
retroactive insurance. Eventually, however, the reinsurance contract led to a
protracted and expensive coverage dispute. a16 Issuers of retroactive
insurance will presumably want to protect themselves from adverse
selection with carefully drafted contract language, but sometimes even
careful drafting will not prevent coverage disputes.
The absence of retroactive insurance for defendants does not
necessarily mean that there would be few purchases of plaintiffs' claims,
because the pool of plaintiffs and the pool of defendants may be different.
Perhaps there is simply no demand for retroactive insurance for defendants.
Large corporations, for example, may be relatively risk-neutral, especially
because they are generally held by shareholders in diverse portfolios, 217 and
such corporations may more often be defendants than plaintiffs, especially
in tort suits. 21 8 Nonetheless, even if a relatively high proportion of
defendants would not benefit from alienating claims;, the total number of
defendants is so large that there must be a large absolute number who are
sufficiently risk-averse that they would pay some fee to liquidate their
uncertain liabilities. Of course, defendants can liquidate their uncertain
liabilities, regardless of the alienation regime, by settling with plaintiffs.
There will, however, be some cases that do not settle, if one party has an
213. See Pamela G. Hollie, Hundreds Are Injured as Blaze Traps 3,500 on the Upper Floors,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1980, at Al.
214. See Marilyn Ostermiller, Changing the Rules for Discounting, BEST'S REV., June 1997,
at 34, 35.
215. Id.
216. See Myrna Oliver, MGM Grand Set To Battle Its Insurers: Case Expected To Last 8 to
10 Months, Cost $342,000 a Day To Try, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1985, § 4 (Business), at 1.
217. Managers of corporations, however, may not be risk-neutral, and corporations as a result
may sometimes seek to diversify risk even though such diversification is not necessary for their
shareholders. See generally Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial
Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981).
218. One datum consistent with this theory is that both plaintiffs and defendants may hire
their lawyers by contingency fee, but it is far rarer for defendants to do so. Because contingency
fees are a form of partial claim alienation, this might seem to suggest that defendants are simply
less risk-averse and would fully alienate claims less often than plaintiffs. There are, however,
alternative explanations for the relative rarity of defendants' contingency fee agreements, focusing
on the difficulty of negotiating them. See Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort
Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 87-88 (1997).
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unrealistic expectation of the likely judgment, for instance.219 If there were
a competitive retroactive insurance market, defendants would purchase
insurance whenever insurance companies offered a better deal than
plaintiffs. The absence of such a market indicates that insurance companies
and other third parties believe that they cannot profitably do so. Similarly, it
is possible that third parties considering purchases of plaintiffs' tort claims
would not believe that they could make better offers than defendants and
still make a profit.
Placing the asymmetric information problem aside, the absence of a
retroactive insurance market is surprising given the dynamics of settlement
negotiations. Consider a case in which the plaintiff and the defendant each
privately estimate the expected liability at $1,000,000 and the cost of
litigating at $100,000 each. Suppose that for each party, this $100,000
includes $50,000 in attorney expenses and $50,000 in risk cost attributable
to the uncertainty of the litigation outcome. 220 This case is one that should
settle, given that both parties will be better off settling than litigating, the
plaintiff for any settlement over $900,000 and the defendant for any
settlement up to $1,100,000. If a defendant were uniquely able effectively
to alienate a claim by purchasing insurance from a relatively risk-neutral
insurance company-for simplicity, a company that also would need to pay
litigation costs of $50,000 if the suit went to trial but no costs attributable to
uncertainty-the settlement range would become smaller, from $900,000 to
$1,050,000. The insurance company would be in a better bargaining
position than the defendant would have been in, and it should thus be able
to capture a greater portion of the surplus from settlement, $25,000 more if
the settlement were in the middle of the range in either scenario. If the
insurance market were competitive, the defendant would in effect be able to
capture this entire surplus. Defendants thus have a strong incentive to
alienate claims. Their failure to do so is thus all the more puzzling and
suggests that asymmetric information may well be a serious problem.
219. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993) (explaining how mutual optimism may hinder
settlement).
220. That is, independent of attorney's fees, each party would be willing to pay $50,000 to
avoid the risk attributable to uncertainty. Even if each side has a subjective assessment of the
average judgment that will result from the trial, this prediction may be erroneous, either because a
party has misestimated the average judgment or because of essentially random factors such as the
identity of the jury ultimately chosen. A risk-averse litigant would be willing to spend at least
some money to avoid this uncertainty and receive the average expected judgment.
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2. Effects on the Legal Process
a. Cooperation
The simplest argument that alienability would interfere with the legal
process is that once a claim is alienated, the alienator has little incentive to
cooperate in the prosecution or defense of the lawsuit. Prosecuting a suit, on
this view, depends not solely on legal skill, but also on access to facts and
evidence, which may be uniquely in the possession of the original parties to
the suit. Defenders of alienability regimes have suggested that a purchaser
could combat this problem by purchasing a right to only a portion of a
claim. "A purchaser thus might purchase only 90 percent of the claim,
leaving the tort victim with 10 percent at risk as an incentive to cooperate in
pursuing the claim."' 22 1 Similarly, a defendant might pay a third party to
assume responsibility for only ninety percent of any subsequent judgment.
In addition, a seller and purchaser might require cooperation by contract,
providing a cause of action in the event of noncooperation. 2  Liability
insurers require cooperation, 3 suggesting that a contractual approach may
be adequate.
Even if such arrangements could not assure full post-alienation
cooperation, a lack of cooperation need not hamper the legal system in
cases affected. Indeed, there is a strong argument that lack of cooperation
might benefit the legal system. Cooperation may be a euphemism for
perjury. A plaintiff who claims high pain-and-suffering damages ordinarily
may have an incentive to exaggerate the pain suffered when testifying,
224
but there is less incentive to lie if the victim will no longer be affected by
the court's judgment because the plaintiff is now a claim purchaser. Other
forms of cooperation in litigation, such as information sharing, may be
important, but the legal system should be able to overcome noncooperation.
The courts, after all, routinely use subpoena powers to force unwilling
individuals to provide information of interest,22 5 and violators face
221. Shukaitis, supra note 1, at 340. Shukaitis argues that "[s]o long as the tort victim and the
purchaser have some stake in the outcome of the case, each has incentive to cooperate in its
prosecution." Id. This is, of course, a simplification. Whether a party will have an adequate
incentive to cooperate depends on the marginal costs of cooperation, including time costs, as well
as on the marginal benefits of cooperation.
222. "[S]uch cooperation clauses are routinely found in standard insurance contracts, which
raise the mirror problem with the defense of claims." Id.
223. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davies, 310 S.E.2d 167 (Va. 1983)
(reporting a case in which the liability insurer refused to pay on the basis of the insured's lack of
cooperation).
224. It is difficult to obtain objective, verifiable appraisals of certain types of losses, such as
pain and suffering. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative
Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 62-67 (1991).
225. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
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sanctions including contempt of court. The litigating parties could seek
information from the original parties just as they could from third parties,
and any incentives to be uncooperative with the opposing party should be
no higher than before.
Nonetheless, use of compulsion is expensive and inefficient. The
possibility of noncooperation thus worsens the adverse selection problem,
especially because knowledge of whether the original litigant will cooperate
is asymmetric. Those who see alienation as an opportunity to reduce their
involvement in the litigation are most likely to alienate their claims, and a
resulting tendency will be that litigated cases are particularly likely to be
lemons involving noncooperating litigants. There is, however, a
countervailing tendency of perhaps even greater concern. The cases in
which plaintiffs are likely to alienate their claims will tend to be those in
which the original litigant's cooperation will be less of an issue. Because
straightforward claims are more likely to be settled than alienated, the cases
in which alienation occurs are likely to be complex. Many of these claims
will demand cooperation from a different set of potential witnesses-
experts. The parties in the best position to buy claims will be those who
have the greatest confidence that they have cooperative experts.
Although expert witnesses serve a useful role in an adversary system,
they pose dangers. Some scholars have worried that courts are ill equipped
to resolve battles among experts.226 An alienability regime increases the
likelihood of a match between a litigant's position and an expert who will
take that position, because an alienability regime allows lawyers, who may
have contacts with experts, to seek out clients, rather than the reverse.227 An
alienability regime's tendency to move claims to those who can best
prosecute them ordinarily would seem like a social benefit, but the
assessment is at least closer once we consider the possibility that the parties
in the best position to resuscitate weak claims may be those best positioned
to make a bad case sound good. Perhaps it is already easy for any litigant to
find an expert who will take any position, but it currently may be difficult
for litigants to assess how effective these experts will be. An alienability
regime would allow someone who has gamed the system in one case to do
so in others as well. If access to experts is one of the few factors that can
overcome the adverse selection barriers to alienation, such access may be
worrisome in a significant percentage of suits involving alienated claims.
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b. Precedent
A second possibility is that alienability might affect the legal system
adversely by changing the pool of cases about which appellate decisions are
rendered and from which rules of precedent are created. Even under our
existing legal system, appellate cases may not be representative of the
broader universe of disputes, because cases that go to trial may be different
from cases that settle,228 because those appealed may be different from
those not appealed, and because judges may selectively decide which cases
to craft written opinions for.229 The selection of cases for appellate litigation
is important not only because some issues may be resolved sooner than
others, but also because the law itself may be path dependent. 230 While
some degree of path dependency may be unavoidable, it may be particularly
problematic if litigants can manipulate the path of decisionmaking. 231
Concern about the possibility of such manipulation, Maxwell Steams has
argued, helps to explain modem standing doctrine.232 If interest groups can
determine when lawsuits are brought, they may be able to manipulate the
path of the law, and legal institutions may have evolved various means of
preventing such manipulation. Perhaps the bar on alienating legal claims is
one such mechanism.
Allowing alienation of legal claims might permit interest groups to
determine when decisions are rendered and perhaps also to determine who
will render them. 233 An interest group, for example, might purchase a claim
specifically because a case presents a particular issue, and the group
believes that aggressive litigation of the issue in that particular court is
likely to create a favorable precedent. The interest group might especially
seek to purchase claims in which the opponents' lawyers are unlikely to be
228. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (providing a model of settlement in which plaintiffs win half of the cases
tried, even if there is no such evenness in the broader pool of cases filed, resulting in a pool of
appellate cases that may not mirror the pool of tried cases).
229. For a criticism of summary decisions without opinions, see Martha J. Dragich, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions To
Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995).
230. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601 (2001).
231. Frank Cross has argued that rational litigants who are repeat players have strong
incentives to settle unfavorable cases and litigate vigorously those with favorable facts, distorting
precedent. See Frank B. Cross, In Praise ofIrrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2000).
232. Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1350-59 (1995) (arguing that, while standing doctrine does not eliminate path
dependence, it helps ensure that path dependence depends on fortuity rather than on litigants'
choices).
233. There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that litigants engage in forum
shopping. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter II Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999).
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effective. One plausible reason for such lack of effectiveness would be that
the immediate financial stakes are small, and the resulting asymmetry in the
stakes if such claims are purchased makes it more likely that the interest
group will succeed in the litigation.234 Similarly, a litigant, whether an
interest group or not, might find a case that presents the same legal issue as
the case in which it is involved but with better facts. The litigant might then
purchase that claim and attempt to ensure that it is resolved by the courts
first. Conversely, a litigant might be concerned about a case with worse
facts and purchase that claim simply to settle it and thus avoid the
possibility of an adverse precedent. More disturbingly, a litigant might
assume a position in a litigation contrary to his own beliefs or interests and
then purposely offer bad arguments in favor of that position, in the hope of
achieving a useful precedent in another case.
Some obstacles, however, might frustrate attempts to manipulate
precedent through claims purchases. While the strength of facts in a
particular case could influence appellate decisions on issues relevant both to
those facts and to very different ones, appellate judges often recognize that
they are making decisions that will affect a variety of different factual
scenarios. The adversarial system gives the opposition incentives to identify
factual situations in which a particular resolution of a legal issue may lead
to results less intuitively attractive than in the existing case. Moreover, it is
quite a bit of trouble to purchase another suit simply out of a desire to
control which of two factual situations is presented to a court first. It is
unlikely that a litigant will be able to identify another case likely to reach
the courts before its own case presenting the same issue but with different
facts. And even when a litigant does identify such a case and is able to
convince the owner to alienate it, she may be disappointed by which case is
decided first. After all, the litigant's opponents may have precisely the
opposite incentives as she does with respect to the order in which the cases
are presented.
Similar possibilities for manipulation exist already. Interest groups can
seek to find test cases that will allow for incremental development of
doctrine in a way that will favor their long-term interests. 235 Third parties,
moreover, can facilitate settlements by giving money to a party, even in
cases that have already been docketed by the Supreme Court, in order to
avoid an unfavorable Supreme Court adjudication.236 Presumably, the legal
234. Asymmetric stakes sometimes can increase the likelihood of settlement. See, e.g.,
Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities
Litigation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 567, 574 (2000). This logic, however, does not apply where the
asymmetry results from different levels of concern about the precedent established by the court.
235. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 161, at 239.
236. This occurred in Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 521 U.S. 1117, cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997) (No. 96-679). For an argument that
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system might address such interference by criminalizing such activity,
holding parties who engage in such activity in contempt of court, or
disallowing collusive settlements.237 That the legal system generally does
not address such interference may suggest that the consequences are small.
Permitting alienation of claims, however, would make manipulation of the
path of decisions far easier than it is today. Paying off litigants to drop
cases is expensive and serves only to delay decisionmaking. Purchasing
claims offers more direct potential to influence the law and at lower cost,
because the claims themselves are valuable assets. Alienability also may
help interest groups force courts to make merits decisions relatively early.
Once again, these problems might seem de minimis if robust markets for
claims emerged, because only a small percentage of alienated cases would
represent attempts at path manipulation. But if adverse selection makes
markets thin, then cases will be alienated only in exceptional circumstances.
If a desire to manipulate case law is a significant such circumstance, then
the costs of allowing such manipulation may be large relative to the benefits
of alienation.
C. Settlement
Attempts at path manipulation could either reduce settlement, as
litigants seek to place issues before the courts, or increase settlement, as
litigants seek to prevent courts from rendering decisions. Even without
deliberate path manipulation, however, adoption of a rule allowing the
alienation of claims could affect settlement rates. The standard economic
theory of litigation indicates that cases will settle when parties' estimates of
the probability of success and expected judgment are not too far apart.238
Alienation of claims, however, is most likely to occur when the claim
purchaser values the claim at a higher level than either its initial holder or
her opponent. Thus, those who purchase claims (or accept money to take
them on) are less likely to be willing to settle. The problem may be more
severe when several potential purchasers bid against one another, because
the most optimistic of the potential purchasers is likely to win the claim.
the settlement was improper, see Roger Clegg, Op-Ed, What Are Civil Rights Leaders Afraid O?,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1997, at A23.
237. The Supreme Court has addressed what some saw as a particularly egregious form of
interference, ruling that a settlement of a case awaiting appeal does not justify vacatur of the
judgment. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994). This case
provides some restraint on parties who wait until after cases are resolved and then settle if the
judgment is adverse, where the settlement is conditional on an agreement to vacate the judgment.
238. See, e.g., Loewenstein et al., supra note 219, at 135-40.
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This danger is an example of the "winner's curse, 2 39 that threatens all
auctions. The application of the curse, however, has consequences not only
for the winner, but also for the legal system as a whole. The thinner the
market for claims overall, the more serious the winner's curse problem is
likely to be in individual cases.
A standard response to winner's curse problems is that rational bidders
will take the winner's curse into account and, at least over time, learn to
discount their bids by its estimated size. 240 If such a rational response
occurs, those who purchase claims will not systematically get bad deals.
Settlement, however, is likely to be reduced as a result of the winner's
curse, even with rational discounting of claim values to adjust for the curse.
The discount that an auction bidder applies to overcome the winner's curse
reflects the amount by which overbidding is likely in general. Even if this
discount is enough so that an auction winner will not overvalue a claim, the
untailored nature of rational discounting means that an auction winner's
best estimate of the claim value will be subject to considerable uncertainty.
The auction winner may have won simply by virtue of better information
about how the courts are likely to rule, and even if he concludes that he
likely did not know about certain information, he will not know whether
such information is more or less important than in the typical case. With a
high-variance estimate of claim value, auction winners will likely spend
more time researching claims. Moreover, they will be more hesitant to
settle because of the greater possibility that the adversary will take
advantage of the auction winner's informational disadvantage.
The possibility of reduced settlement with alienated claims is of
concern not only because of the corresponding increase in the cost of
litigation, but also because cases that do not settle are more likely to set
precedents. In particular, alienability might produce a relative increase in
precedents in areas of law that are relatively clear. These cases may be
relatively likely to be alienated because information asymmetry is less of a
danger when the law is clear,241 but once alienation occurs, the analysis
suggests that a smaller percentage of these cases will settle than otherwise
would without alienation. Even assuming the number of alienated claims is
239. The winner in an auction is "cursed" because she is likely to be the party who most
overbid. E.g., RICHARD H. THALER, The Winner's Curse, in THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES
AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50 (1992).
240. See Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An Empirical Study of an Auction with
Asymmetric Information, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 865, 879-82 (1988) (testing this prediction).
241. Informational asymmetry presumably would ordinarily be about facts, but it could also
be about law. Someone might be particularly eager to sell a claim after a complex legal analysis
revealed that the claim probably would not succeed. Moreover, when the law is clear, that will
often be because of established bright-line rules, making factual ambiguity less of a concern. On
the other hand, plaintiffs generally may not seek to alienate cases in which the law is clear,
because they may face less risk from such cases. So, the net effects are difficult to determine.
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small, if alienation significantly reduces the chance of settlement, the
overall effect on the pool of precedents could be large because taking
litigation all the way to trial and appeal is ordinarily so rare. 42
The magnitude of these effects is difficult to predict, and there might be
countervailing considerations. Perhaps parties in the best position to be
claim purchasers will be those who are particularly skilled at achieving
settlements, and this consideration might offset the reduction in settlement
traceable to information problems. If plaintiffs and defendants both alienate
claims, then litigation might often involve repeat players who have an
incentive to cooperate and possibly to trade across cases, also increasing
settlement. Some litigants might refuse on principle to settle with their
adversaries but be willing to alienate claims to third parties, and those third
parties might be able to obtain settlements. Yet again on the other hand,
some litigants might settle because they do not psychologically want to face
trial, and alienation might allow transfer of claims to those less afraid of
confrontation, decreasing settlement.
The problem is precisely that the effects are so difficult to predict. My
argument is not that adverse selection dooms economic arguments in favor
of permitting alienation of legal claims but that it adds considerable
complications, and that these problems conceivably could be severe relative
to the benefits that claim alienation would provide. Such problems might
turn out to be small, however, and my purpose is to suggest that any
experiments with permitting alienation would need to be monitored closely,
not that society should not dare to experiment.
III. MANDATORY ALIENATION
In law, as in boxing, the names of the parties become the name of the
event: Ali-Frazier, Marbury v. Madison. Perhaps this is just convention, but
it reflects that in the end, a civil suit ends with a judgment dictating how the
defendant must act with respect to the plaintiff. As in boxing too, the main
event often seems like a sideshow, with pretrial maneuvering by lawyers or
pretrial decisionmaking by judges turning the trial into an anticlimax that
rarely lives up to the hype. Any result but a definitive knockout leaves the
decisionmaker open to claims of bias or folly, and even a definitive victory
may be seen as the product of seemingly irrelevant circumstance-failure to
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train in the optimal location in boxing,24 3 ineffective attorneys in law.244
The metaphor, though, cannot be stretched too far, for in boxing, eventually
the combatants are alone together in a ring, the trainers and promoters left
to give advice and watch. The same cannot be said of law, where the trial
may never occur and where, even if it does, the lawyers take center stage.
And yet we persist in referring to lawsuits by the names of the parties.
This convention rests on a sound foundation in a legal system in which
claim alienation is rare, for whatever their involvement, the parties are
bound by the court's judgment. It is possible, though, to imagine an
opposite regime, one in which the parties never have a stake once a case
reaches trial. In a mandatory-alienation regime, parties would be required to
alienate their legal claims. That is, a plaintiff would be forbidden from
initiating a lawsuit on her own behalf and instead would be required to sell
the legal claim to a third party. Similarly, a defendant would be required to
pay off a third party to assume the burden of any judgment. Settlement
could occur in a mandatory-alienation regime both before and after
alienation. So far, this Article has considered the possibility of alienation in
a world of trial, but the mandatory-alienation regime allows a comparison
between a world in which the final outcome of an unresolved dispute for
the litigants is trial and one in which it is alienation.
The mandatory-alienation hypothetical turns out to have some
surprising benefits, but it seems unlikely that any legislature would enact it.
My purpose is solely to use this hypothetical as a heuristic to evaluate how
the market would perform as a legal system. Previous scholars considering
restraints on alienation have failed to consider the dynamics of a market for
tort claims, in effect taking the market prices for claims as exogenous. They
have thus not considered whether a market could acceptably substitute for
judges and juries in valuing legal claims. Because the original parties to
litigation would never be directly affected by a judicial decision in a world
of mandatory alienation, the construct forces us to consider whether claim
sales could do justice as to the original parties in a litigation. Relevant
economic considerations include how accurate the market is likely to be in
evaluating claims and how costly the market process itself would be.
243. See, e.g., Ken Jones, Amateurish View on Altitude Proves Lewis' Downfall,
INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 26, 2001, at 24 (blaming favorite Lennox Lewis's failure to train at
high altitude for his loss to Hasim Rahman in a championship bout).
244. Many analysts, for example, second-guessed the result of the O.J. Simpson trial by
blaming the outcome on one set of attorneys or the other. See, e.g., JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE RUN OF
His LIFE: THE PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON (1996) (arguing that ineffectiveness by prosecutors led to
Simpson's acquittal); Albert W. Alschuler, How To Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of
Lord Brougham and the OJ. Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 299-317
(1998) (attributing the outcome in part to unethical practices by defense counsel).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 114: 697
2005]
Mandatory alienation is a particularly useful heuristic for assessing a
world in which alienation is pervasive but not universal. Although this
Article has shown that there are substantial nonlegal obstacles to
development of robust markets for claims, it is possible that these obstacles
could be overcome in some contexts. If there is some substantial number of
claims for which the advantages of alienation outweigh the disadvantages
attributable to adverse selection, then adverse selection might be less of a
problem for other claims. Perhaps asymmetric information is relatively
unimportant for some areas of law because the legal outcome depends little
on eyewitness testimony or credibility determinations. The same arguments
that show how a market for claims could unravel also indicate that if some
critical number of claims were alienated, the market could ravel back up
again. The mandatory-alienation hypothetical assumes away the challenges
that might block formation of a robust claim market and focuses attention
on the market itself. The resulting question is whether the various
arguments developed in Parts I and II would continue to apply if a robust
market for some type of claim were to develop.
This Part argues that the arguments would no longer apply. Section A
reconsiders the economic arguments. Not only would a mandatory-
alienation regime make the economic concerns discussed above far less
significant, it would also have other virtues. Although a full empirical
analysis is impossible without experimentation, the market likely would
price claims relatively accurately, considering at least information in the
possession of the party whose claim was alienated and perhaps other
information as well. Whether these virtues would be sufficient to overcome
the economic vices of mandatory alienation is uncertain, but the virtues
would, for the most part, exist without the vices of a permissive-alienability
regime in which alienation was rare. The economic analysis thus suggests
that if pervasive alienation can overcome adverse selection, the market is
likely to be a strong substitute for a court system for those claims that are
alienated.
Section B, however, suggests that noneconomic concerns would
become more serious in a mandatory-alienation regime. Once claim sales
were no longer voluntary, arguments about commodification, corrective
justice, legal ethics, and procedural justice would at least become more
powerful. A caution is that there is a meaningful moral difference between
a world in which alienation is required and one in which almost everyone
voluntarily alienates claims. A final philosophical assessment of a
successful alienability regime may thus depend on the extent to which
alienation is coerced. Although a full philosophical analysis of coercion is
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beyond the scope of this Article,2 45 if alienation is financially attractive,
there is, in effect, a tax on those who choose not to alienate. If that tax were
so high that someone could not afford trial, it seems fair to consider
alienation coerced, but the coercion might be lessened with a lower
effective tax and a lower resulting alienation rate.
A. The Economics of Mandatory Alienation
The most obvious virtue of a mandatory-alienation regime is that it
addresses the adverse selection problem. Some degree of adverse selection
would remain if settlement were still permitted, but potential buyers would
no longer wonder why the seller wished to sell. It is a familiar point from
analysis of insurance that compulsory insurance eliminates any danger that
adverse selection will cause the market to unravel.246 Thus, mandatory
alienation may be necessary for the purported advantages of alienation,
such as enabling plaintiffs to obtain judgments and defendants to liquidate
liabilities more quickly, to materialize. Mandatory alienation would not
eliminate the other economic problems associated with alienation. It would
still be possible, for example, that alienation would facilitate interest group
manipulation of the path of legal decisions, but it would no longer be the
case that such attempts at manipulation would exist in a relatively high
percentage of cases alienated. Similarly, while mandatory alienation would
still help to match claims and experts, it would no longer be the case that
alienated cases were particularly likely to be those in which litigants
ordinarily would not be able to find persuasive experts to adopt their
positions. Finally, alienated cases would no longer be those in which the
purchaser had a particularly rosy view of the case, so the danger that
alienation might frustrate settlement would be reduced.
Ordinarily, eliminating an option makes a person worse off (or at least
no better off), and it might seem that if a party did not want to alienate a
legal claim, the legal system must be making her worse off by requiring
alienation. A duty to alienate could make a litigant better off, however,
even though it would restrict her options. The reason is that such a duty
furnishes a sufficient explanation for the individual's decision to alienate.
The decision to alienate a claim ordinarily conveys negative information
about the claim's value, but removing the option means that no negative
information is conveyed. There would be no stigma in trying to alienate a
claim if everyone were required to do so, and thus a rule requiring
245. I provide a brief introduction. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 293, 312-13 (2002) (noting that requiring purchase of environmental
insurance would reduce adverse selection problems).
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alienation would make better off parties who would alienate their claims
anyway and parties who would not alienate solely because of the negative
information that a decision to alienate would convey. The only litigants
who could be worse off are those who would choose not to alienate their
claims even in a hypothetical world in which there was no negative signal
associated with the alienation decision.
The enactment of a rule mandating alienation of legal claims, whether
in one area of the law or more generally, would not merely affect individual
parties or cases, but would change the nature of litigation more broadly.
The market mandate would create third parties who in effect would become
judges of the underlying claims. The following analysis thus does not
consider whether any particular party would benefit from mandatory
alienation, nor does it attempt to sum up the winners and losers in search of
a net gain or loss. Rather, it evaluates mandatory alienation as a market
process that resolves the claims of the original litigants in a dispute. The
combination of the neutrality and prospective interest of the third parties, as
well as competition among them to value claims accurately, would drive
this process. Properly conceived, a rule mandating alienation would not
save disputants from litigation, but it would transform how they
experienced litigation. For the initial litigants, the market would in effect
become what is now the trial. The economic viability of the rule would
depend on the nature of both this shadow legal process and the legal
process that would remain.
One benefit of mandatory alienation is that it would help to neutralize
any systematic bias of decisionmakers. For example, if courts are
systematically biased toward plaintiffs in insurance claim litigation,247
mandatory alienation would offer a solution.248 It may be difficult for a jury
to focus on the terms of an insurance contract when a policyholder has
suffered a serious injury. Regardless of whether the jury believes that the
insurance company has acted appropriately, there is a redistributive
temptation to take a few dollars out of the company's deep pockets.249 With
247. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 101-32 (1986). My argument does not depend on the direction of the bias. If
courts exhibited a bias in favor of large insurance companies, mandatory alienation similarly
could help.
248. This example is particularly interesting because it is possible that insurance companies
could require mandatory alienation in insurance contracts. See ABRAHAM, supra note 212, at 32-
37 (describing the drafting of insurance contracts). Perhaps the absence of such contracts suggests
that insurance companies are skeptical that mandatory alienation has any benefits, but the
apparent absence of any prior mandatory alienation suggests that companies may not have even
considered it. It is also possible that insurance companies would avoid requiring mandatory
alienation because it might lead to negative publicity and legislative or judicial overrides.
249. Such a temptation need not be irrational. If utility is a logarithmic function of wealth,
then it will often seem to advance social welfare ex post for many individuals to pay a little to
offset the injury of one, at least placing aside the problem of interpersonal aggregation of utility.
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mandatory alienation, by contrast, a jury's decision would have no
immediate effect on the policyholder or the insurance company, and there is
no inherent reason for the jury to favor one party over another. The jury
thus could simply do its job by interpreting the contract without preference.
The premise of this argument is that a court is more likely to arrive at
the best answer to a legal dispute when the decision does not directly affect
any of the parties to that dispute. This may be counterintuitive, because
achieving a just result is presumably high among the concerns that a court
takes into account. 50 The fact that the original parties to a dispute would
not be involved in litigation, however, does not mean that judges and juries
would be unconcerned with justice. To the contrary, they would still be
concerned with achieving justice, but the transfer of claims to third parties
means that they would be concerned only with the precedential effect of
their decisions broadly conceived, not with economic redistribution
between the original parties. Any sympathy for an individual party, when in
tension with the requirements of law and the demands of public policy,
would be tempered by the recognition that the party would not be affected
directly. Thus, if juries cared at all about the ex ante benefits of fostering an
environment in which contracting parties can expect their agreements to be
honored, they would be less likely to be biased in interpreting such
agreements when their decisions would have immediate effects only on
claim purchasers.
If the post-alienation trials that would occur in a mandatory-alienation
regime would eliminate certain biases, then competitive forces should
prevent such biases from affecting claim prices.251 For mandatory alienation
to be justified, however, the market must not only resolve legal claims
without bias, it must also resolve them relatively accurately.252 That is, the
prices at which claims are alienated must be sufficiently close to their
underlying value to advance the goals of the legal system. The principal
impediment to an efficient market would be the same as with a regime in
which alienation is optional: asymmetric information. Litigants may have a
See generally AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 264-65, 279 (1982)
(discussing interpersonal comparisons of utility).
250. A judge's perception of justice may, of course, not be congruent with her perception of
legal correctness. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 118 (1995) (acknowledging
that "views concerning the public interest undoubtedly affect judicial preferences, just as they
affect voter preferences").
251. Competition does not always eliminate bias in labor markets, given the existence of a
taste for discrimination. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 43-45
(2d ed. 1971). Any taste that jurors might have for discrimination in favor of plaintiffs, however,
seems unlikely to affect market sales of claims should mandatory alienation succeed in leading
jurors not to act on such biases.
252. For an explanation of the importance of accuracy in adjudication, see Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996).
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great deal of information about their cases, while third parties have less. If
there were a mandatory-alienation requirement, asymmetric information
would not prevent a market from forming, but it could result in sale prices
differing from the amount a plaintiff would receive if permitted to take the
case to court.
Even in a mandatory-alienation regime, however, plaintiffs would have
incentives to share information with potential purchasers. At the least, a
plaintiff would have an incentive to share with a third party any information
that would make the third party tend to believe that the claim was more
valuable than others. Thus, a plaintiff with an unusually severe accident
would be eager to make a physician's report available to a potential
purchaser. Moreover, once it was in the interest of some plaintiffs to make
available information, other plaintiffs would have an incentive to do so as
well lest buyers conclude that they were hiding information. They might do
so not only by spontaneously producing documents, but also by responding
to third parties' requests for information. While this effect might not lead
every plaintiff to reveal every relevant document, economists have
recognized that the dynamics of such markets may make relying on the
information of interested parties a relatively efficient procedure.253
The information third parties acquire would not necessarily be all the
information that might be relevant to a decision about a claim's likely
worth. For one thing, plaintiffs seeking to alienate their claims might
commit fraud by fabricating documents, giving false statements about the
events pertinent to the lawsuit, or withholding relevant documents while
claiming to have produced them.254 It might seem that private contractual
arrangements could effectively deter fraud. Plaintiffs, for example, might
bond their claims by agreeing to pay any damages attributable to
information not released.255 The problem is that such agreements would
undercut the mandatory-alienation regime because they would leave the
original litigants exposed to the risk of litigation. A claim sale with a
warranty is, in effect, not a complete sale of the claim. If the courts were to
enforce agreements between original litigants and claim purchasers, they
would need to do so carefully to ensure that the agreements were not simply
a mechanism to opt out of the mandatory-alienation requirement.
253. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested
Parties, 17 RAND J. EcON. 18 (1986); see also Chris William Sanchirico, Relying on the
Information of Interested-and Potentially Dishonest-Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 320
(2001).
254. See, e.g., Luthy, supra note 1, at 1017 ("Courts also have suggested that the prohibition
on assignment is necessary because without it assignors will exaggerate their injuries or overstate
the strength of their cases in the hope of persuading others to purchase their claims."). Luthy
counters that repeat-player assignees "should be in a good position to learn how to protect
themselves from exaggerated claims." Id.
255. See supra text accompanying note 200.
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Fraud, however, need not be a greater problem in this context than in
any other market. Companies planning to merge engage in due diligence by
searching each other's files for relevant information, and presumably some
form of such due diligence would occur in a mandatory-alienation regime
as well. There is always a danger of elaborate frauds that would deceive
even a careful buyer, but there is no reason to fear that such fraud would be
pervasive. As long as there remained the possibility of criminal sanctions,
alienators would have incentives to limit their sales pitches to spin rather
than lies. This is, of course, what keeps our existing legal system honest, or
at least from moving too far in the other direction. A mandatory-alienation
regime would merely transfer the time at which there was an incentive to
fabricate or withhold evidence. If penalties for fraud in the legal claims
market were as severe as for perjury at trial, the claims market would be no
more likely to reward deceit or punish its absence than our existing legal
system.
Placing fraud aside, there remains a separate problem that third parties
might not be able to access information in the possession of the adversaries
of those whose claims they seek to purchase. Defendants might choose to
cooperate with prospective purchasers of a plaintiffs claim, however. By
doing so, they might discourage a third party from buying a claim by
convincing him that it had no merit. Even where litigation was inevitable, a
defendant might share some of its evidence because it worried that a claim
purchaser would be particularly hesitant to settle a claim at a loss. A
defendant also might cooperate with a third party because it might hope that
the party would choose to take over the defendant's claim rather than the
plaintiffs. Indeed, it seems likely that third parties would consider taking
over claims from either side, given that the costs of researching one
potential transaction would be small after having researched the other.
Some defendants, however, might nonetheless choose not to cooperate with
prospective purchasers of plaintiffs' claims, and vice versa. A plaintiff, for
example, might insist that a potential buyer have no contact with the
defendant, especially if the plaintiff intended to reveal information that
could be useful in surprising the opponent at trial.
Even if, in a particular case, a third party had to rely entirely on
information in the plaintiffs possession to evaluate the claim, there is a
strong argument that this would not produce excessively inaccurate results.
Lack of information effectively serves an insurance function. Imagine two
plaintiffs who sustained identical serious illnesses after participating in a
medical experiment, and suppose each plaintiff knows that the defendant
has in its possession information indicating that its negligence caused one
of the plaintiffs' illnesses, but neither knows which one. If risk-averse, the
plaintiffs presumably will wish to agree to share the award that one will
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receive. Restrictions on claim alienation in our existing legal system might
preclude this, and the facts in the real world are rarely sufficiently stark to
make such contracts possible. But paying off plaintiffs in proportion to the
probability that their injuries will prove attributable to a defendant's
negligence is a way of completing such a hypothetical contract. 256 The
mandatory-alienation system thus can be seen as one that compensates tort
plaintiffs for their wrongful losses but then redistributes compensation to
create an insurance scheme based on the uncertainty of information
unavailable to the plaintiff.
This defense is limited, however, because a litigant may have
knowledge that only information in the possession of an adversary could
verify. For example, one of the plaintiffs in the above hypothetical might
know from personal recollection that the defendant was negligent and that a
videotape in the defendant's office is likely to prove it. If claim purchasers
cannot verify the existence of the videotape before formal discovery, the
plaintiff will not receive as much compensation as his information would
suggest is deserved. The mandatory-alienation process thus could not claim
to achieve results that are accurate as to all information in the possession of
the litigant whose claim is being alienated. Information that a litigant knows
but cannot prove to third parties absent discovery will not be adequately
factored into claim prices.
Of course, it is possible to imagine a mandatory-alienation regime that
allowed for some discovery. One approach would be to require alienation
only after discovery has occurred. A problem with this approach is that
transferring a claim at an early stage may promote efficiency. If claims
were sold only just before trial, many of the benefits of alienation, such as
allowing plaintiffs to receive damages early and encouraging consolidation
of related claims for discovery, would be lost. An adverse selection
problem, however, might beset any attempt to transfer claims before
discovery, as litigants who feared that discovery would undermine their
claims would be most likely to seek to alienate their claims early. Perhaps a
compromise would be to allow limited discovery before alienation, 257 so
that a litigant could obtain the information that it believed was most likely
to be useful, especially information that it already knew existed.
A mandatory-alienation regime thus could be expected to achieve a
level of accuracy approaching that obtained by trial, but if it is to be
appealing relative to a world of trial, it must reduce the cost of litigation.
256. Similarly, negligent defendants might hypothetically agree to contracts that would
require probabilistic payments based on whether their negligence in fact caused victims' injuries.
257. Litigants, for example, might be allowed to use only a limited number of their
interrogatories before alienation. Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (allowing parties only twenty-five
interrogatories in the absence of permission of the court or written stipulation).
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Third parties might well be likely to prosecute litigation more efficiently
than the original parties. 258 The economic account of settlement suggests
that the identity of the parties litigating a claim should not matter, because
whether settlement occurs is a function of the parties' estimates of the
expected award and the cost of litigation. Yet in a litigation universe in
which the vast majority of cases settle, many of those that don't may reflect
litigant obstinacy and collateral consequences of litigation as much as
financial calculation. Third parties who buy legal claims have strong
incentives to settle the claims, because ongoing litigation decreases their
profits. Moreover, third parties might be better positioned to agree to forms
of alternative dispute resolution, for example, by entering into multilateral
agreements to resolve a wide variety of claims through such channels. Even
in the absence of such agreements, third parties who faced each other in a
number of lawsuits might achieve economies of scale and promote
settlement by negotiating the various claims together.
259
The alienation process itself, however, might be costly. It might seem
initially that those who alienate legal claims are saved the cost of litigating
cases, but of course they pay for litigation costs indirectly, with plaintiffs
receiving less and defendants paying more to alienate their claims because
of post-alienation litigation costs. Whether these costs are lower or higher
than actual litigation costs would have been depends on the third parties'
efficiency in resolving claims. Adoption of a mandatory-alienation regime,
however, would not simply lead to litigation costs being paid early in a
lump sum, because such a regime would entail additional costs. For a claim
purchaser to make a profit, her initial costs of researching a claim also
would have to be compensated, and this expense too would be passed on to
the original parties. Indeed, in a competitive market, the alienating party
would be forced to pay not only for the research costs of the purchaser of
the claim, but also for an amount equivalent to the research costs of all third
parties who considered purchasing the claim.26°
The total cost of mandatory alienation would depend in part on the
complexity of the issues. The more complex the case, the more difficult the
claim would be to value. Third parties seeking to maximize profits would
spend money on investigating claims until the marginal cost of doing so
258. A significant caveat is that the winner's curse problem, which might reduce settlement,
still applies.
259. Ordinarily, a lawyer courts an ethical violation by trading off cases of different clients in
settlement negotiations. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2004) ("A lawyer
who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the
claims of or against the clients ... unless each client gives informed consent .... The lawyer's
disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims .... ). This would cease to be a
concern, however, if there were no clients being represented.
260. See supra note 201.
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exceeded the marginal benefit. With greater uncertainty, the marginal
benefit of increased investigation would be higher, because of the chance
that further investigation, whether of a legal or a factual issue, would lead
to a substantial change in the estimated probability of the claim's success.
Not all types of uncertainty are of equal significance. If additional
information seemed unlikely to improve the chance that a claim would
prevail, then little money would be invested in investigating the claim. For
example, when the outcome in a case depends on a subjective application of
the law to a particular set of facts, uncertainty may be great but not
particularly costly in a mandatory-alienation regime. In contrast, cases
dependent on complex analysis of rules or precedents may have more costly
uncertainty, if a preliminary analysis of those rules or precedents could
reach an incorrect answer.26'
The costs of the mandatory-alienation process would also rise with the
number of potential purchasers. More third parties would mean a lower
probability that any one would ultimately be able to purchase the claim, and
thus greater research costs would be passed along to the original parties in
the form of less attractive deals. Indeed, the total amount of research could
be in excess of a social optimum, as the marginal benefit to a third party of
engaging in additional research might be greater than the marginal social
benefit of the resulting additional accuracy. Moreover, much of the research
undertaken could be redundant, with each third party independently forced
to learn about the lawsuit and conduct appropriate research. The situation is
analogous to the stock market, in which the total amount of research
conducted may be above the social optimum, because a trader who can
identify mispricing can profit to the entire amount of the mispricing, even
though the social value of research in terms of ensuring efficient allocation
of a marginal dollar of social resources is considerably less than a dollar.262
Not only may we end up with too much stock market research, but much of
it may end up being redundant.
The market for legal claims would likely develop responses to these
inefficiencies, however, in the mandatory-alienation context.263 A firm with
a reputation for offering fair prices, for example, might enter into an
arrangement in which a plaintiff would have to reimburse its research costs
261. On the relationship between legal complexity and uncertainty, see Peter H. Schuck,
Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (1992).
262. See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 561, 563-67 (1971) (reaching this insight); Lynn A. Stout,
Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81
VA. L. REv. 611, 667-71 (1995) (explaining the insight in more detail).
263. Commentators have identified market responses in traditional security markets. See, e.g.,
Yoram Barzel et al., The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Excess Search (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005]
The Yale Law Journal
if she rejected the firm's eventual offer.2 64 Indeed, different third parties
might offer different tradeoffs between cost and accuracy in assessing
claims, and thus the original parties might be able to choose how important
accuracy was to them, with greater accuracy more appealing to relatively
risk-averse parties but coming at a higher cost. Similarly, a litigant who
anticipated benefiting from competitive offers could agree to communicate
with only a small number of third parties, with more competition again
coming at a higher price. The cost of redundant research would thus likely
be low and exist only when an original party decided that the benefits of
redundancy exceeded the costs. In addition, any research that the third party
who eventually purchased the claim conducted would not be wasted, as he
could then use that information in the subsequent litigation. Even though
his research costs ultimately would be paid by the original parties, those
costs might lead to reduced litigation costs. Thus, the only significant costs
from researching claims would be those attributable to third parties who did
not eventually buy the claims, and the market should be efficient in keeping
such costs relatively low.
Even this is an overstatement of the costs of the mandatory-alienation
approach, however, because the creation of the market would reduce search
costs and agency costs. In the existing legal regime, those who wish to sue,
and those who find themselves the unfortunate recipients of a legal
complaint, must find lawyers. One can find a lawyer quickly, for example,
by seeking a reference from a local bar association. Lawyer quality,
however, is difficult to measure,265 and consumers of legal services may
spend time choosing among different possible representatives, considering
factors including education, past success, and fee structure. Of course,
litigants may simplify their.search by relying on proxies, such as the size of
a firm's advertisement in the telephone directory or the beauty of its offices.
Efforts by law firms to make themselves seem more attractive should count
in search costs, too, for part of such expenses are surely passed along to
clients.266 Moreover, proxies can be misleading, and litigants may
sometimes make poor choices in selecting lawyers. The lawyers may not be
the best ones to handle the particular type of claim-perhaps not competent
264. An alternative approach would allow the firm to purchase a call option to buy the claim
at a prespecified price. Such an arrangement might deter other third parties from researching,
while still giving the option owner the chance to negotiate for a better price if its investigation
revealed that the claim was not worth as much as expected.
265. Martindale-Hubbell offers a rudimentary rating system based on surveys. See
Martindale-Hubbell, Lawyer Ratings, http://www2.martindale.com/company/ratings.html (last
visited Dec. 11, 2004).
266. But see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977) (expressing doubt that
advertising would increase the cost of legal services and noting that advertising may increase
competition).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 114:697
On the Alienability of Legal Claims
enough, perhaps too expensive-or they may not be sufficiently loyal to
their clients, pursuing their own interests at their clients' expense.
The creation of a mandatory-alienation regime would not eliminate
search costs, but it could reduce them significantly. Litigants would still
need to contact potential purchasers of their claims and, if they desired to
limit the number of bidders, would need to do some research on the
purchasers. But, once the field was narrowed down to a small number, the
largest bid would be all the litigant needed to know. Law firms would have
incentives to determine what types of claims they are best suited to handle,
with the market directing higher-quality legal services to cases with greater
complexity and greater stakes. Such bidding is not possible in a legal
system that makes legal claims inalienable, and it may be impractical in an
optional-alienation regime. Moreover, the alienation of legal claims would
largely eliminate agency costs, because the purchasers would have
appropriate incentives to balance the costs of legal expenses with their
benefits in terms of increasing or decreasing the expected judgment.
Because litigants would pay for agency costs in the form of either higher
legal fees or lower judgments, their elimination might offset or even surpass
the costs of a mandatory-alienation regime. Thus, a mandatory-alienation
regime might be particularly advisable when agency and search costs are
high.
The ultimate comparison, of course, is an uncertain one, and only an
experimental mandatory-alienation program could potentially reduce these
uncertainties. My purpose, however, is not to argue that a mandatory-
alienation regime would be superior to the existing regime, but merely to
show that such a regime is more attractive from an economic perspective
than one might expect. The ultimate point is that a world in which voluntary
alienation becomes quite common despite adverse selection problems might
be an attractive one. If sufficiently common, a decision to alienate legal
claims would carry little negative informational value, and the litigant could
expect compensation that reflected at least information in her possession
about the value of the claim. The principal potential drawbacks of the
mandatory-alienation regime are the danger that a litigant would be forced
to alienate a claim despite unverifiable knowledge, or the danger that she
would alienate a claim even when the expense of the alienation process was
relatively high, but these would not be concerns in a voluntary-alienation
regime that somehow overcame adverse selection. The analysis of Part II
suggests that this may be a pipe dream, but if it is a pipe dream come true,
economists should have little complaint.
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B. Noneconomic Considerations Revisited
1. Commodification
The analysis above of whether commodification theory would
disapprove of claim alienation was divided into two questions: first,
whether alienation is corrosive of personhood, and second, whether an
individual should be allowed to trade personhood for other goods. The
second inquiry no longer presents a possible escape when alienation is
mandatory, so a focus on the first is sufficient. If resolution of claims by a
judge or jury is important to the personhood of a litigant, then removing any
possibility of such resolution might inappropriately commodify. Although
pretrial resolutions of cases, whether made involuntarily by judges or
voluntarily by mutual consent, suggest that formal resolution in court
cannot be a requirement if our judicial system is to be justified, the
possibility of such resolution is another matter.
In our existing legal system, a litigant who states a valid claim (or
defense) and can survive summary judgment has the right to a trial. Perhaps
this right is important not only to the personhood of those who exercise it,
but also more broadly to litigants who settle. A claim that a lawsuit isn't
about the money becomes far less plausible when the contingent right to
trial is lost,267 even for a litigant who would accept a settlement in lieu of an
authoritative judicial resolution. If the ability plausibly to make such a
claim, or at least to convince oneself thereof, is important to personhood,
then mandatory alienation poses a greater threat to personhood than
permissive alienation.
That it poses a greater threat does not mean that it poses a great threat.
The commodification claim is not an a priori philosophical one, but rather a
contingent empirical one. The empirics depend on both economics and
psychology. After all, if the argument in Section A is correct, then a regime
of mandatory alienation might be quite successful at pricing claims, and
perhaps such success would bring a perception of legitimacy, which would
in turn provide an alternate foundation for, or defense of, personhood.
Moreover, the concern is that mandatory alienation may prevent someone
from effecting personhood by filing or defending a lawsuit. It might,
however, have the reverse effect. Someone who otherwise might not be
able to afford a lawsuit might now be able to initiate a claim, and someone
who could not afford to defend one alone now might find someone else
267. Litigants frequently remark to journalists that they are bringing claims for reasons other
than money. See, e.g., Mary Hannigan, A Penny for Your Thoughts, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002,
at C3 (noting such a comment in a potential suit on behalf of a girl who was struck in the head by
a tossed coin, allegedly inducing headaches).
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willing to do so. Thus, if maintaining a lawsuit in some form is important to
preserving personhood, mandatory alienation might help.
In addition, mandatory alienation may provide an opt-out mechanism
that adverse selection otherwise might make practically unavailable. Some
may, like Learned Hand, "dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else
short of sickness and death., 268 Lawsuits can be ugly, and traded
accusations may upset a litigant's self-conception as a decent or righteous
person. If it is plausible that individuals define themselves through
litigation, then litigation may also have the capacity to threaten self-
definition. Alienation of legal claims might preserve personhood by
limiting this threat to self-conception.
Perhaps the strongest argument that commodification brought by
mandatory alienation would threaten the legal system would focus not on
the litigants themselves, but on society's perception of the legal system.
The system may be structured to maximize its educative role and thus to
foster the perception of legitimacy. 269 Civil litigation seems likely to be of
far less importance than criminal litigation in this respect, but let us suppose
that the behavioral messages sent by civil litigation are important too. A
system in which a few claims are sold or many claims are settled seems
unlikely to undermine the educative role of civil litigation, because there
will still be some trials with the original claimants as participants, and it
takes only a few to convey the needed behavioral messages. Mandatory
alienation might remove that backstop from public view, as trials that were
only about the money and no longer included the initial litigants would lack
drama and limit litigation's behavioral messages. Confidence in the legal
system accordingly might decline. Though concern about institutional
legitimacy does not fit squarely into Radin's theory, one might argue that
belief in the legitimacy of our legal institutions is part of our collective
personhood. If so, commodification is arguably problematic.
The difficult question is whether a regime permitting but not requiring
alienation might impinge on personhood if alienation became so common
that pursuit of a claim to trial became rare. If such pursuit were rare, it
presumably would be because of its expense. Indeed, considerable expense
likely would need to be attached to traditional trying of cases before the
268. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach the Heart of the Matter, Address
Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 17, 1921), in 3 JAMES N.
ROSENBERG ET AL., LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics, 1921-1922, at 89, 105 (1926).
269. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1357 (1985). But see, e.g., Ronald J. Allen,
Rationality, Mythology, and the "Acceptability of Verdicts" Thesis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 541 (1986)
(arguing that Nesson's thesis is not descriptively accurate); Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the
Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 MtNN. L. REV. 1057 (1986) (arguing
that the hearsay rule is inconsistent with Nesson's argument).
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adverse selection impediments to claim markets could be overcome. If that
is so, there is an argument that alienation, though voluntary, is coerced.270
Permissive alienation might not be coercive because it is not the option
to alienate that coerces. Rather, coercion results from any inherent flaws in
the justice system that make alienation so relatively attractive. Once
permissive alienation becomes commonplace, however, there may be
reduced pressure to ensure the feasibility of pursuing a legal case to trial,
just as the existence of plea bargaining may encourage lawmakers to
impose a more severe sentence on defendants who insist on trial than we
would accept in a world without plea bargaining.271 Thus, adopting a
permissive-alienation option might indirectly be coercive if it substituted
for other forms of legal reform, as proponents have advocated.272
Permissive alienation also might indirectly prove coercive if alienation by
many stigmatized the few who refused to alienate, such as by leading jurors
to mistake a litigant's tenacity for an indication that others thought the
claim economically valueless. My point, however, is not so much to
conclude that permissive alienation would be coercive as to establish that
commodification concerns are greater when alienation is common than
when it is rare.
2. Corrective Justice
Voluntary alienation by a defendant of a claim does not offend
corrective justice because nothing in corrective justice requires that a
wrongdoer directly repair wrongful losses instead of indirectly repairing
them through, for example, insurance. Similarly, a plaintiffs decision to
have wrongful losses rectified by a third-party claim purchaser does not
violate corrective justice, because corrective justice is satisfied as long as
wrongful losses are repaired, regardless of whether the wrongdoer directly
pays. Similar arguments could be used to defend a mandatory-alienation
regime, but these arguments would be weaker. A mandatory-alienation
regime would mean that a wrongdoer would never directly rectify a
270. Owen Fiss has asserted that settlement may often be coerced, although he does not
consider the nature of coercion in making the claim. Fiss, supra note 161, at 1075. The most
prominent account of coercion is Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND
METHOD 440 (S. Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969). See also David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage
Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121, 124 (1981) ("P coerces Q only if he changes the range of
actions open to Q and this change makes Q considerably worse off than he would have been in
some relevant baseline situation.").
271. On the coerciveness of plea bargaining, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role
in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
272. See Choharis, supra note 1, at 443-47 (arguing that alienation may help accomplish tort
reform).
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victim's loss, but the amount the wrongdoer paid and the amount the victim
received would be indirectly related, because both would reflect predictions
of the same possible trial.273 If we could be confident that wrongful losses
would be repaired and that the market process imposed no new wrongful
losses by forcing payments by those falsely accused of wrongdoing,
corrective justice would be satisfied. The problem is that, at least in the
absence of an effective discovery regime, the alleged wrongdoer's payment
would depend only on evidence in his possession that third parties could
identify and verify, and the amount the victim received would similarly
depend only on evidence in her possession.
I argued above that this need not be troubling from an economic
perspective, and indeed that asymmetric judgments may better advance
economic objectives, because each side's outcome will not depend on the
happenstance of information unknown to it. Market resolution, however,
may be more troubling from a corrective justice standpoint, because
corrective justice demands repair of the wrongful losses that a tortfeasor has
caused and no other losses. One might still argue that mandatory alienation
satisfies corrective justice by emphasizing Coleman's point that "corrective
justice requires administrative rules establishing burdens of proof and
evidence. 274 If mandatory alienation is the system that best implements
corrective justice, even though each litigant's outcome may be unaffected
by information in the other side's possession, then mandatory alienation
may satisfy corrective justice. One might argue, however, that a system that
has an evidentiary framework that makes little effort to ensure that all
available evidence is considered does not "provide the best chance of
practically implementing corrective justice,, 275 and, therefore, does not
satisfy it even if it advances other objectives.
To see the problem of one-sided evidence more clearly, consider a
hypothetical from Leo Katz276 based on the movie The Morning After:277
After a night of drinking that she no longer remembers, a woman wakes up
with a dead body and a gun with her fingerprints on it. A prosecutor
investigating the case would like to place her in jail for some time in any
event, because he suspects her of other crimes. It later turns out that there is
a film of the events locked in a safety deposit box. Should we allow the
woman and the prosecutor to agree to a plea bargain in which she will be
273. Heidi Hurd argues that there is only an "uninteresting, if not genuinely trivial"
distinction between a system in which payment is direct and one in which it is indirect. Heidi M.
Hurd, Correcting Injustice to Corrective Justice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 51, 57 (1991).
274. COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 395.
275. Id.
276. LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED
PUZZLES OF THE LAW 188 (1996).
277. THE MORNING AFTER (Warner Bros. 1986).
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charged with a lesser offense, with the film to be viewed only after the
bargain is complete? 278 Katz answers no,279 because "whatever the evidence
finally reveals, we are 100 percent certain to regret our present decision to
let the plea bargain go through," and a "decision we are certain to regret a
moment from now should presumably not be made., 280 Just as the legal
system should not tolerate this plea bargain, one might argue, it should not
allow for a plaintiffs recovery or a defendant's liability to be resolved
based only on the information in the possession of one party. If the legal
system is obliged to open the safety deposit box, so too is it obliged to
consult the other party's evidence.
Assume that Katz's analysis is correct. The difficult question is whether
the argument survives the translation from criminal law to tort law. What
the hypothetical labels as immoral is not the defendant's decision to accept
the plea bargain but the prosecutor's offer of it. If we change the
hypothetical and suppose that the defendant, but not the prosecutor, has
seen the tape, the prosecutor's decision to offer a plea bargain before seeing
the tape seems just as troubling as before.281 (A smart prosecutor would not
do this because the defendant would accept the offer only if the tape were
incriminating.) The prosecutor's offer is immoral because the tape will
either show that the defendant did not commit the murder and is thus being
punished excessively, or that she did commit the murder and is being
punished insufficiently. These failures to impose the retributively proper
amount of punishment,282 moreover, are completely avoidable. The
immorality is in the prosecutor forgoing what the legal system deems the
best result based on a private suspicion that the system deems irrelevant.
278. Both parties would agree to the deal, Katz assumes, because "neither side wants to be
exposed to the not insignificant risk that the evidence might not turn out 'well."' KATZ, supra
note 276, at 189.
279. "[E]ven those who ordinarily have no problem with plea bargains," Katz concludes,
"must have qualms." Id. Though Katz does not explain the difference between this situation and
an ordinary plea bargain, the difference is presumably that an ordinary plea bargain is based on
uncertainty about how a decisionmaker would respond to evidence rather than uncertainty about
what the evidence itself will be. Katz's hypothetical troubles us not because bargaining about
whether to consider evidence is inherently wrong but because willful blindness to the truth is
wrong, at least in the context of the hypothetical. Thus, to conclude that bargaining not to consider
evidence is wrong in the civil context, we cannot rely on the wrongness of bargaining about
evidence per se.
280. Id.
281. Katz might disagree with this analysis. He states that the plea bargain is "problematic"
because it "involve[s] contracting out of one's just deserts." Id. This implies that the defendant's
decision to accept a plea bargain also would be immoral, perhaps because she should own up to
her conduct. In any event, Katz's focus on just deserts indicates a restriction of the analysis to the
criminal context.
282. Assuming that the punishment that is consistent with commission of whatever crimes
the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt is retributively proper.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20051
A public prosecutor must act in the best interests of society and not for
the sole purpose of maximizing penalties. A private litigant, however, is not
so ethically restricted. Suppose we change the hypothetical in a different
way, so that the woman wakes up next to an unconscious victim of a battery
who also has no memory of the circumstances, and the case is a civil one
between the woman and the victim. We would have little trouble with these
parties resolving their differences without seeing the tape, agreeing with
each other that, whatever happened, it is best to move on and to
compromise. The victim does not act morally wrongly in deciding that
some compensation for his injury is better than none and that he does not
want to risk the possibility that the tape identifies someone else (perhaps
someone who is judgment proof) as the culprit. That the victim could assure
the "correct" outcome by insisting on viewing the tape does not make his
decision not to do so wrong, because he is bargaining away his own rights.
As long as we do not conceive of retribution as a purpose of the civil law,283
a decision by private parties not to seek out the truth seems quite different
from a similar decision by a prosecutor in a criminal matter, and the
justification for the court's refusal to honor the agreement disappears.
Even so, a requirement that parties alienate their claims is different. A
system that seeks to achieve corrective justice cannot decouple defendants'
duties and plaintiffs' rights even if most plaintiffs and defendants would
agree in a hypothetical contract to such decoupling. Corrective justice
demands that defendants repair wrongful losses that they have caused, not
those that they think they might have caused, and it demands the repair of
plaintiffs' wrongful injuries, not just those injuries that appear to be
wrongful based on information in the plaintiffs' possession.
The corrective justice problem would emerge because mandatory
alienation would solve the adverse selection problem. In a regime in which
alienation was voluntary and occasional, it would be rare for the alienation
price to exclude significant information not available to the alienating
litigant. Claims in which there was a strong possibility that the other party
had undisclosed information would be unlikely to be alienated as a result of
adverse selection. Litigants sometimes would not have any inkling of what
evidence might be in the possession of their opponents, but they would
have trouble convincing third parties that they really lacked such
knowledge. The cases in which opponents might have information about a
case would tend to be the same ones in which third parties were worried
about whether litigants' desire to alienate reflected knowledge that their
283. See Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 CAL.
L. REv. 231, 277 (2001) ("Though a dominant justification for penalties in criminal law,
retribution is hardly ever invoked as a civil justice value. Indeed, it may well be because
retribution is so closely associated with criminal law that it seems an ill fit for civil concerns.").
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cases were lemons. But if alienation were mandatory or common, claims
would be alienated based on one-sided evidence, and thus the corrective
justice concerns about one-sided evidence would become more serious.
Of course, as I have argued, a voluntary disclosure or partial discovery
regime could allow much evidence in others' possession to affect the prices
at which claims are alienated. 284 If so, such discovery might be enough to
make a mandatory-alienation regime the best way of implementing
corrective justice. Unlike a market economist, however, an advocate of
corrective justice may not tolerate a significant cost in achieving corrective
justice merely because of offsetting economic benefits.285 Of course, the
case that corrective justice is satisfied might be easier when the regime in
question is a permissive-alienation one in which alienation becomes
common. The issue of coercion once again would become critical, but
corrective justice would remain at least more problematic if alienation were
common, rather than rare.
3. Legal Ethics
A statute instituting mandatory alienation would not necessarily raise
formal ethical problems. Either it could explicitly permit lawyers to
purchase claims, trumping any existing rules, or it could prohibit lawyers
from purchasing claims, in which case purchasers would need to hire
lawyers independently. Mandatory alienation, however, would further erode
lawyer-client relationships and thus accentuate concerns like Kronman' s.
286
It is possible that some clients alienating claims would hire a lawyer to
assist in their presentations to potential claim purchasers, but many clients
might choose to forgo the expense, recognizing that a competitive bidding
process would give bidders incentives to obtain the relevant information.
The problem would be less severe with a permissive-alienation regime in
which alienation was common, but any amount of alienation would weaken
lawyer-client ties. If alienation became the norm, many litigants might
never hire lawyers, and without legal advice they would take what they
could receive, but the legal system would be less comprehensible. Whether
or not this is a substantial cost, widespread alienation would exacerbate
problems that seem modest when alienation is rare.
284. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 60, at 431 ("One problem with imposing corrective
injustices in order to annul greater wrongful losses is that it threatens to turn corrective justice into
a form of efficiency.").
286. See KRONMAN, supra note 110.
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4. Procedural Justice.
That mandatory alienation would be more likely than permissive
alienation to threaten litigants' psychological perceptions of procedural
justice is straightforward. A regime that permits alienation increases litigants'
options and thus, presumably, their ability to control the process. Mandatory
alienation would remove this option and, therefore, necessarily decrease
process control, even if it conceivably might provide more process control
than an inalienability regime. Mandatory alienation would be particularly
worrisome in a lawsuit in which a finding or admission of wrongdoing or
innocence was as important to the litigants as any money involved, because a
process that necessarily reduced to money might prove unsatisfying. Parties
who would not alienate because they care about something other than the
direct financial consequences of the judgment are differently situated from
those who would alienate but for the lemons problem. Even if every other
litigant in the world alienated claims, for example, a plaintiff genuinely
pursuing a case for dignitary reasons might prefer to keep control over a
litigation, even at financial expense. On the defense side, a newspaper
concerned more about its reputation than about money, for example, might
not want to lose control over its defense of a libel suit.
Even parties who would prefer not to alienate their claims for
nonfinancial reasons, however, conceivably could benefit from a
mandatory-alienation regime, as long as it required both parties to alienate
their claims. Often, in litigation where one party cares about the result for
reputational as well as financial reasons, the other party will be concerned
about nonfinancial factors as well. In such a case, the total amount that the
parties spend on litigating will be greater than the financial stakes warrant.
A mandatory-alienation regime, however, might provide an indirect way of
binding both parties to spend on litigation in proportion to the financial
stakes. This is principally an economic benefit, but it also would improve
procedural justice, because less expensive litigation might allow both
parties to retain more process control than litigation that became complex,
especially if the additional spending was on procedural wrangling rather
than on substance.
There would, however, be cases in which one party cared more about
the reputational implications of the case than the other. Many such cases
would settle, as the party who placed more value on an admission of
wrongdoing would give financial concessions in exchange for a favorable
resolution of this issue.287 Some such cases, however, would not settle, for
287. In rare instances, an admission of wrongdoing may be sufficient to satisfy public
prosecutors. See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt et al., U.S. May Be Open to Andersen Settlement;
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example, because the defendant might take the position that it would not
pay a cent or admit any wrongdoing. 288 The interest of the litigants who
care about more than financials in such asymmetrical reputational-stakes
cases may argue against a mandatory-alienation regime, because mandatory
alienation would deprive such litigants of autonomy in controlling the
lawsuit. The legal system plausibly is concerned with reputation as well as
money, both in absolving civil defendants of wrongdoing and in
condemning those guilty of wrongdoing. Forcing alienation may interfere
with this function, particularly if third parties were to enter into a settlement
that did not send a clear message about the relevant decision.289
Thus, in both cases that are solely about money and those in which one
or both litigants care about the expressive effect of the court's judgment,
mandatory alienation may decrease process control and prevent litigants
from pursuing their goals through the legal system. Similarly, one might
argue that a permissive-alienation regime in which litigants generally
decide to alienate their claims because of the heavy cost of litigation
effectively removes an option, at least relative to a permissive-alienation
regime in which trial is economically more feasible. The difficult
comparison for procedural justice is between a permissive-alienation
regime in which alienation is common and an inalienability regime,
especially if the reason that alienation becomes common is that the
permissive-alienation regime makes trial less attractive, for example,
because the social need to maintain trial as an economically feasible option
declines. In such a case, alienability arguably does not enhance the options
of litigants, but it changes them, and the comparison depends on whether
the market or trials are better at promoting procedural justice.
Admission of Wrongdoing Short of a Guilty Plea Might Satisfy Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4,
2002, at A3.
288. This is particularly likely where the defendant is the party who cares more about its
reputation. In a libel case, for example, a newspaper might arrange a settlement in which it admits
no wrongdoing, or it might refuse even a nominal settlement on principle. Cf William Glaberson,
'60 Minutes' Case Part of a Trend of Corporate Pressure, Some Analysts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1995, at B 14 (noting that many news organizations have backed away from past strategies of
vigorously fighting all libel cases).
289. On the other hand, such asymmetric reputational-stakes cases also provide an economic
argument for a mandatory-alienation regime. If a litigant will litigate a case more vigorously than
the financial stakes justify, then a potential adversary concerned only with the financial stakes
might be discouraged from litigation. While any litigant would like the adversary to expect
vigorous litigation, a party with a strong interest in reputation will, in effect, be able to credibly
threaten such vigor. If we assume that the legal system's goals are generally advanced by parties
bringing any valid legal claims they have, then discouraging such suits is problematic, especially
if a reputational loss attributable to identification of wrongful conduct is viewed as a social
benefit. Mandatory alienation would eliminate the problem because the original litigants would
recognize that both third parties would spend money in proportion to the financial interests at
stake. Thus, even if the reputational effects of litigation are an important part of the system,
indirectly forcing both parties to spend money in proportion to the financial stakes may advance
the goals of the system by equalizing the playing field.
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The balance may depend on how common trials would be in an
inalienability regime. If hearings for deprivation of welfare benefits are
frequently held and successful in instilling feelings of procedural justice,29 °
then a switch to a permissive-alienation regime may thwart procedural
justice. Arguably, this is so even if hearings are no less convenient and
available than before. That litigants may be willing to accept immediate
payment over the chance to tell their story does not mean that a system that
allows them to do so necessarily provides greater procedural justice. If,
however, hearings were inconvenient and rare in the inalienability regime
and claimants routinely settled with the government before any hearings,
then a regime of permissive alienability, by giving claimants an option
other than settlement, might increase litigants' options and thus their
process control. A procedural justice evaluation of an alienability regime,
therefore, depends not only on whether such a regime coerces litigants,
assuming that it does at all, but also on how much coercion would exist in
an inalienability regime.
CONCLUSION
It is common to conclude theoretical inquiries about legal procedure
with a recommendation for further empirical work. I will not do so. Further
legislative and judicial developments could mean the elimination of barriers
to alienation in one or more jurisdictions, and such an experiment would
help test this Article's prediction that robust markets for claims will not
develop. But resolution of this prediction will not be sufficient to determine
the acceptability of alienation. If this Article's prediction is accurate, only
occasional alienations would result, and, while the net costs might exceed
the net benefits, as long as alienation is rare the total effects are likely to be
small. If this Article's prediction is wrong because, for example, claim
purchasers can litigate cases so efficiently that the adverse selection
obstacle is overcome, the economic concerns about claim alienation
disappear. If the theories underlying the noneconomic concerns are
accepted, however, then the noneconomic concerns would be weightier and
conflicting, but the experiment would be unlikely to determine how to
weigh them against the economic benefits.
290. The opinion that frequent welfare benefits hearings increase claimants' feeling of
procedural justice is not, however, universal. For a summary of arguments that Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), did not succeed in achieving dignity for welfare applicants, see Rebecca E.
Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV.
U. L. REv. 9, 25-26 (1997) (noting that Goldberg led to "more uniform and less discretionary"
welfare policy, resulting in a bureaucracy many see "as being both sterile and ineffective").
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